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Parent through Artificial
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I. INTRODUCTION
The profile of the Amel'ican woman has
changed in many important ways in the last two
• The authors are graduates of Rutgers UniversitySchool of Law, New Jersey.
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decades. 1 Women have achieved increasing independence and control over their own lives, in part

1. For example, the percentage of women in the labor
force has increased from 37.8% in 1960 to 52.3% in 1981.
The percentage of women heading households in the United
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because of greater reproductive freedom. This
freedom extends to choices concerning procreation, abortion, sexuality and motherhood. 2
An increased degree of control over their reproductive capacity has allowed some women to create an alternative approach to motherhood which
is outside the traditional family sphere. It is possible for a woman to postpone motherhood until
she is economically able to support and to raise a
child without a marriage partner.
An unmarried woman can become a parent in
several ways. She can parent a child who is not
biologically her own through adoption or foster
care, or she can assume parenting responsibilities
for someone else's child without a legal arrangement. She can also become a single parent by
conceiving a child through sexual intercourse or
through artificial insemination,. If she has intercourse, she can become pregnant with or without
the knowledge of the father. If she artificially
inseminates, she can do so with or without the
knowledge of the donor.
Artificial insemination by donor (AID) 3 is playing an increasingly important role in providing
options for the single woman in her reproductive
choices. While the procedure is not new, 4 its use
as a means of parenting for single women and
lesbian couples is gaining popularity. 5
States has risen from 9.3% in 1960 to 14.6% in 1980. The
rate of single women over 18 years old has risen from 13. 7 %
in 1970 to 17 % in 1980. The percentage of unmarried
women giving birth to children has increased from 5.3% of
all births in 1960 to 17.l % in 1979. The number of mothers
in the labor force with children under six years old has
increased from 4,500,000 in 1970 to 6,000,000 in 1980.
There has also been an increase in the use of contraceptives
by women and an increase in the number of abortions. The
abortion rate per 1,000 women has increased by 50 percent
in the five years between 1972 and 1977. UNITED STATES
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES (102d ed. 1981).
2. See BosTON WoMEN's HEALTH BooK COLLECTIVE,
OuR BODIES, OURSELVES (2d rev. ed. 1979).
3. Artificial insemination permits fertilization of the
embryo without sexual intercourse. Semen from a donor is
inserted into a woman's vagina with the use of a syringe.
4. The earliest artificial insemination in humans was performed in 1790 by John Hunter, a Scottish surgeon. The first
reported successful human insemination in the United States
was performed by Dr. J. Marion Sims in 1866. The procedure became generally accepted between 1920 and 1930.
Callin & Newman, Whose Child is This?, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS
14 (1979).
5. It has been estimated that 250,000 people in the
United States alone have been conceived by artificial insemination. F. MIMS & M. SWENSON, SEXUALITY: A NuRSING
PERSPECTIVE 192 (1980). See also LESBIAN HEALTH INFORMA-
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This paper will focus on AID as a means of
reproduction chosen by single women and will
discuss the practical considerations and legal implications of that choice. Because of the unconventional subject matter of this work, the authors
have chosen to present our underlying premises at
the outset. It is our belief that the understanding
of controversial issues is fostered by an acknowledgment of the values that support a particular
position.
Legal arguments supporting the right of a single woman to be a single parent through AID are
based upon what one scholarly article has called
the "freedom of intimate association." 6 As used
here, this freedom does not mean absolute license
to do whatever one pleases. Rather, it is a recognition that such decisions as whether to relate sexually or platonically, to marry or to remain single,
to give birth or to abort, involve serious moral
responsibility that rests with the individual making the choice. In a free society, one's moral judgments are not to be predetermined by coercive
forces of the state, but should be the expression of
the religious beliefs or philosophical convictions
unique to each person. Intimate associational
choice is at the heart of the values represented by
a pluralistic society, and is protected by the liberty and equality guarantees of the United States
Constitution.
In the present context, freedom of intimate association. renders unfair the suppression of one
form of intimate association-that between the
single mother and her child-in order to advance
or preserve another more conventional formthat between the mother, father and child. However desirable the idealized nuclear family is to
the majority, promotion of this ideal constitutes
an insufficient justification for the state's suppression of alternative forms of intimate association,
absent some showing of independent harm resulting from these alternatives. 7 Restrictions imposed
TION PROJECT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: AN ALTERNATIVE
CONCEPTION, (1979) (available from Lesbian Health Information Project, c/o San Francisco Women's Centers, 3543
18th St., San Francisco, CA 94110); WoMAN CONTROLLED
CONCEPTION (available from Union Wage, P.O. Box 40904,
San Francisco, CA 94140); Stern, Lesbian Insemination, CoEvoLUTION Q. (Summer 1980).
6. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89
YALE L. J. 624 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Karst].
7. See id. at 657-58. Karst argues, in the context of
prohibitions on homosexual conduct, that there is no legitimacy in an effort by the state to advance one view of morality by preventing the expression of another view.
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on the freedom of intimate association, whether
through the imposition of burdens or the deprivation of benefits, must be independently justified.
The formal status of marriage is a key to the
availability of benefits, such as access to professional AID facilities 8 and judicial enforcement of
a mother's right to custody of the AID child
against the claims of a semen donor. The following discussion concerns whether deprivation of
such benefits constitutes an infringement of single
women's rights under the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution. 9
In assessing whether a Constitutional violation
exists, we will evaluate the justifications that can
be advanced to support this deprivation of benefits, such as the arguments that it is not in the
child's best interests to have been conceived
through AID, that single parent families burden
state resources and that the state may act to discourage illegitimate births. An explanation of the
methods of AID conception and the practical and
legal concerns that influence a single woman's
choice of a particular method precede our discussion of the legal issues raised by AID.
II. AID METHODS
Artificial insemination can bt~ utilized by a single woman in three ways. First, the prospective
mother can be inseminated with the help of professional services, either at a sperm bank or
through an independent physician. 10 Second, she
8. Doctors and clinics frequently follow a policy
against providing AID for single women, see infra notes 2122, 48-52 and accompanying text. Furthermore, states tha't
have statutes governing AID typically limit its administration to licensed doctors so that self-AID may constitute the
unauthorized practice of medicine. Shaman, Legal Aspects
of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331, 346-47 (197980).

9. This paper is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of how the law affects the single woman who decides to
bear and raise a child conceived through AID. Rather, it is
confined to an examination of the protections offered such a
woman by the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. The first amendment and arguments concerning the freedom of expression are relevant to this issue and
deserving of separate discussion. It is also possible that relevant constitutional and statutory provisions exist in each
state which could serve as a basis for additional protections.
Furthermore, issues of reproductive freedom can potentially
be argued on the basis of federal statutes and on the United
States Constitution's thirteenth amendment prohibition
against involuntary servitude.
10. Her marital status may preclude her from choosing
this method. See infra notes 21-22, 48-52 and accompanying
text.
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can conceive through AID outside of a professional arrangement. That is, she can solicit the
help of a third party liaison or go-between who
selects the donor for her and arranges the insemination. The go-between carries the sperm from
the donor to the prospective mother without disclosing the identity of either party to the other.
Finally, she may choose to inseminate without
anonymity and may work out the arrangements
directly with the donor. Each of these methods
involves practical considerations and raises different concerns for the prospective AID mother.
A.

AID with an Unknown Donor Through a
Sperm Bank or Private Physician

For a woman intent on sole legal custody of her
child, the major benefit of artificially inseminating through a sperm bank or through a private
physician is the minimal risk of a future legal suit
by the donor for custody or visitation. Our search
did not uncover a single suit initiated by a donor
against a woman who had conceived through a
professional service. Likewise, there is no record
of a suit by a mother against either a sperm bank
or a physician-screened donor, or by an AID child
against a donor for parental support obligations.
To insure a continuous donor pool, doctors
must guarantee that a donor's identity will never
be disclosed. In a 1979 survey of doctors "".ho
perform AID, 11 anonymity of the donor was
found to be of paramount concern. The survey
shows that secrecy is deemed important to protect
the donor from legal involvement. 12 To guarantee
anonymity, physicians often intentionally keep inadequate records or inseminate patients with multiple donors in a single cycle, making the identity
of the genetic father uncertain. 13 Physicians justify these practices in light of recent court orders
to open the records of adoption agencies. 14
While these practices are primarily designed to
protect the anonymity of a sperm donor, they also
minimize the legal risks taken by a donee. 15 One
drawback of this method is that the control of the

11. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practices
of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300
NEW ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CurieCohen survey].
12. Id. at 589.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See infra text accompanying note 29.
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selection of donors remains in the hands of the
professionals involved. Of the 471 doctors surveyed, 91.8 % do not allow recipients to select
their own donors, and the remaining 8.2% consider input from recipients only rarely. 16 Of the
doctors surveyed, "(62 per cent) used medical students or hospital residents; 10.5 per cent used
other university or graduate students and 17.8 per
cent used both [as donors]." 17 The remaining doctors in the survey "obtained donors from military
academies, husbands of obstetric patients, hospital personnel and friends of the physician." 18
Although possession of certain genetically transmitted traits would justify rejection of potential
donors, the medical screenings reportedly done by
the doctors in this survey are superficial at best.
While most doctors do take medical histories of
the donors, the questioning is most often limited
to a report of genetic diseases existing in the family of the donor or the use of a short checklist of
common familial diseases. 19 Since the information
is obtained by questioning the donor, its accuracy
depends upon the donor's knowledge and opinions
of what constitutes inheritable disorders. The survey reveals that a number of doctors expect medical students and hospital residents to screen themselves prior to donating and noted that donors
who are financially motivated to donate may be
less than reliable. 20
Gaining access to professional facilities is a major problem for the single woman wishing to select a professional AID procedure. The great majority of women currently served by sperm banks
and private physicians are married. It was reported in the Curie-Cohen survey that only 9.5 %
of the women inseminated by doctors were without a male partner. 21
There is at least one case challenging the policy
of a clinic that refused to accept an application
from a woman because she was single. 22 The Mott

16. Curie-Cohen survey, supra note 11, at 586.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 588. Doctors reported that donors are generally paid between $20.00 and $100.00 per ejaculation. "Almost half the doctors (45. 7 per cent) paid $25.00 per ejaculation .... " Id. at 587.
21. Id. at 585.
22. Although the case was not fully considered by the
court, the plaintiff prepared a brief outlining the constitutional arguments supporting her position. Because the clinic
is operated by Wayne State University and is funded in large
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Clinic in Michigan, a division of Wayne State
University, had a policy which systematically denied unmarried women the right to apply for AID
services. With the assistance of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), the applicant initiated a
suit challenging this discrimination by the sperm
bank but the clinic abandoned its policy and accepted her application before the case reached a
resolution by the courts. It is unclear how the
court would have ruled had the case been fully
litigated. Requiring the doors of AID facilities to
be opened to single women is an affirmative act of
enforcement. For reasons to be discussed, the
courts may be unwilling to do more than passively
ignore the fact that many single women will conceive through non-professional methods. If courts
decline to act, single women or lesbian couples

part by the State of Michigan, there is state action and state
support of the clinic's policy. The plaintiff argued that the
policy interferes with her fundamental right to procreate,
bear and raise a child. The plaintiff further argued that
these fundamental rights are guaranteed by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. She relied on Supreme
Court decisions finding fundamental rights in marriage and
procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42
(1942) and related rights to contraception, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); family relationships, Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); child rearing
and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) and the decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973). The plaintiff also argued that the policy
interferes with her personal right because AID is the only
acceptable means for her to have a child. She pointed to the
fact that while single parent adoption is acceptable to the
state, there is a preference by adoption agencies for two
parent families and the chances for actual adoption are minimal. She also argued that to compel her to engage in sexual
intercourse would be a clear violation of her personal privacy and that if she were to conceive, the legal rights given
to a putative father would interfere with her fundamental
right to raise her child. She would be faced with the same
interference if she were to conceive by artificially inseminating with a known donor, C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160,
377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977) (for further
discussion of C.M. v. C.C., see Part IV, Section B, infra).
The plaintiff also challenged the marriage requirement because it is overly broad and creates an irrebuttable presumption that all unmarried women are unfit to be mothers. In
addition to the due process argument, the plaintiff claimed
an equal protection violation since the policy discriminates
without a compelling state interest. She addressed the most
likely state argument that there is a legitimate societal interest in the welfare of children born through AID. The plaintiff pointed to Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), a
Supreme Court decision stating that the question of whether
or not to have a child is a matter of personal conscience and
a woman is free "to bring the child into life to suffer the
myriad social, if not economic disabilities that the status of
illegitimacy brings . . . . " Id. at 386.
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may still be denied access to AID through a professional service.

B.

AID with the Help of a Go-between

A second method of artificially inseminating
involves the help of a third party go-between. An
arrangement is made between the woman seeking
AID and another person who chooses the donor,
negotiates the arrangements between the woman
and the donor, and transports the sperm from the
donor to the woman. There is no direct contact
between the donor and the prospective mother.
This necessarily requires that there be trust between the go-between and each of the parties
involved.
This method of AID promises more security
from a possible legal suit than does the method
involving a known donor, and the problems of
accessibility to professional services are avoided.
Nevertheless, when using a third party go-between instead of a professional service, this security is reduced by the high risks of disclosure. Use
of a go-between usually requires that the prospective mother and donor be in the same geographic
area. Often they have ties to the same community. This creates an increased possibility that anonymity will not be preserved. One can imagine
how, in a small community, word might easily
travel from one party to another. 23 There is also
the possibility that the child will bear a physical
similarity to the donor. In addition, the go-between may inadvertently mention one party's
name to the other. All of these possibilities raise
serious considerations for the participants. 2 4
A safeguard that can be employed is to have the
go-between gather sperm from several donors but
give just one sample to the inseminating woman.
This reduces the risk of disclosure because only the
go-between knows who the actual donor is. However, this method also multiplies the logistical

23. A donor's natural inclination to tell his friends that
he is contributing to such a process can lead to an inadvertent co.mment to a friend of the woman receiving the sperm.
!he fnend, who knows the woman is inseminating, is then
m the position of either disclosing what s/he knows or of
withholding important information from a friend.
24. In one community, a situation did arise where the
name of a donor was inadvertently mentioned to a friend of
the prospective mother. In another situation, a go-between
unintentionally mentioned the prospective mother's first
name to her donor. Interview with anonymous Philadelphia, Pa. (Mar. 1981).
'
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problems because it requires arrangements and
pick-ups from more than one donor.
In addition to anonymity, this method of artificial insemination offers other advantages. Specifically, there is an opportunity for the prospective
mother to have input into the choice of donor
access to limited medical information about th;
donor and access to paternal identity in the future. Because the go-between is someone the
woman knows and deals with directly, she can
suggest certain traits she desires in a donor, such
as race, physical characteristics, or ethnicity. If
there is a special need for medical information in
the future, the go-between can be asked to contact the donor and request it. And, since access to
paternal identity is likely to become important to
the child in later life, some arrangements can be
made, if all parties are agreeable, to permit disclosure of the donor's name at some set date. For
example, the donor's name may be put into a
safety deposit box to which the child can have
access when s/he reaches a predetermined age.
This maintains the minimal risk of a custody suit
while the child is of minor age, yet later permits
the child to learn the donor's identity.
There are also difficulties with the method.
First, a desirable go-between may be difficult to
find. Being a go-between involves enormous responsibilities, as well as risks and frequent inconveniences. A person assuming this role must be
absolutely committed to it. S/he must be a person
with a certain amount of flexibility in her schedule and a willingness to be available when
needed. While a woman may be able to estimate
the days in a month when she will be ovulating,
she cannot control the timing .. When the woman
is ovulating, the go-between must make arrangments with the donor to have the sperm ready and
must be available herself for pick-up and delivery.
Inseminations are generally done two or three
days during each cycle, and since it is estimated
that women who become pregnant by AID are
inseminated for an average of 3. 7 months these
arrangements could become quite time consuming. 2s
Finally, there is the remote yet real possibility
that the go-between will be put in a difficult legal
situation. This could arise if either party decided
25. See Curie-Cohen survey, supra note 11, at 587 (those
who do not become pregnant generally discontinue the program after approximately 6.4 months, id.).
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to sue for disclosure. For example, if the mother
decided to sue for support, she could bring the gobetween to court and the court could order disclosure. The same could happen if the donor chose to
sue for paternity rights. 26 These situations could
force the go-between to choose between a contempt of court charge for failure to reveal the
name of the donor or donee, and the violation of a
serious trust ifs/he did reveal the name(s).
What rewards are there for the person who is
the go-between? In a recent interview, a woman
who has acted as a go-between said that her reward is "the pleasure of knowing the woman and
having contact with the child that is born." 27

C.

AID with a Known Donor

Although AID with a known donor creates the
greatest risk that the donor will subsequently
claim legal rights to the child, many women are
choosing this method. They are willing to accept
this risk because this method of AID eliminates
potential difficulties in gaining access to medical
information, permits the prospective mother to
make the choice of donor herself, and allows the
child access to paternal roots.
Once the donor is found, the logistics of the
actual insemination are simple. The procedure
can be done at home without professional assistance.
However, for legal reasons, a medical doctor
may be asked to participate. Having a licensed
physician involved in the insemination may be an
asset to a mother's legal defense if the donor later
sues for paternal rights. The Uniform Parentage
Act includes a provision which says, in essence,
that a donor of semen is not the legal father where
that donor has given his sperm to a licensed physician for an insemination. 28 While this provision
was probably designed to protect donors who provide semen to sperm banks or private physicians,

26. Although there is not a case of this type known to the
authors, this concern was expressed by a go-between and we
believe it is worthy of mention. Interview with a go-between, Philadelphia, Pa. (Dec. 1980).
27. Id.
28. VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 5, 9A U.L.A. 592-93 (1979).
One analysis of this section of the act states that "the purpose
of this section is clearly to protect anonymous donors from
legal responsibility for any children fathered by the use of
their semen .... " Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66
CALIF. L. REV. 611, 614 (1978).

[Vol. 7:251

it could also be raised by a mother seeking protection from a paternity suit by a donor.
A second reason for inseminating with the help
of a licensed physician is to demonstrate the intent
of the parties. Donors who originally claimed they
wanted no rights or responsibilities later have
been known to demand the right to visitation. 29 If
a custody suit were to arise between an AID
mother and a donor, the court may view the initial expectations (or intent) of the parties as relevant. 30 Having a medical professional perform the
actual insemination may help to de-personalize
the relationship between the parties as well as
provide a credible witness who can attest to the
fact that no paternal expectations existed at the
time of insemination.
Intent can also be documented by a written
agreement between the prospective mother and
donor in which they clearly state their expectations. While a written contract is not binding in a
child custody suit, a court may consider it in deciding a case. 31 One danger in having a signed
agreement, however, is that it is evidence that the
contesting donor is in fact the biological father of
the child. A woman who conceives through AID
may decide not to document the donor's paternity
with a signed contract. 32
In addition to the legal problems already mentioned, there is also the practical difficulty of
finding a desirable donor who will agree to the
arrangement desired by the prospective mother. A
woman may want a donor to remain entirely removed from the child during the early years, yet
be willing to acknowledge his paternity when the
child wants to know his/her paternal roots. Some
women prefer that the donor always be known to
the child but be treated more like a distant uncle

29. HITCHENS, LESBIANS CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD: LEGAL
ISSUES IN DONOR INSEMINATION 4 Qune 1981) (available from
the Lesbian Rights Project, 1370 Mission St., 4th fl. San
Francisco, CA 94103).
30. In C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821
(Cumberland County Ct. 1977), the court granted parental
rights to the donor after finding that the donor had "paternal
expectations" at the time of the donation. The case was
initiated by a known sperm donor against the single mother
of an AID child. See infra Part IV, Section B, for further
discussion of this case.
31. See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377
A.2d 821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977); Commonwealth
v. Viehdeffer, 235 Pa. Super. 477, 344 A.2d 613 (1975). See
also infra note 35.
32. Interview with lesbian couple, New York, N.Y.
(Nov. 1979).
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than a father. Whatever the arrangement, it is
essential for the donor to understand and accept
his role in relation to the AID child.
While it is difficult to find a desirable and willing donor, it is not impossible. A more significant
problem is that the donor may have stronger paternal feelings than expected. Even the most wellintentioned donor may feel differently after the
child is born and may decide to sue the mother for
parental rights. This is a very serious risk, especially in light of the possibility that the courts will
grant him those rights. 33
III.

CONCERNS OF THE SINGLE AID MOTHER

The decision to inseminate by any of the methods mentioned above necessarily depends on the
availability of the method. A woman's marital
status and her sexual preference may preclude her
access to a sperm bank or a private physician's
help. If she would prefer the assistance of a gobetween, she must find someone who would be
able and willing to accept this responsibility.
Some of these obstacles are likely to be overcome
if she elects to find and deal directly with a known
donor. When the identity of the donor is known,
however, other important factors must be considered.
If the identity of each party is known to the
other, there is an inherent risk to each. The mother's concern is that the donor may one day sue her
for custody of the child. The donor bears the risk
that the mother will sue him for support. 34 Since
contracts involving children are generally unenforceable35 the safest way to minimize these risks
is to maintain an anonymous relationship.

33. See C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821
(Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
34. One man contemplating becoming a donor expressed
his fear that the mother would one day abandon the child,
leaving him with parental responsibility. Interview with a
potential donor, Philadelphia, Pa. (Mar. 1981).
35. Courts have generally held that contracts for the
adoption of children in return for pecuniary consideration or
for release from support obligations are void as contrary to
public policy. See Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF.
L. REV. 611, 613 (1978). The policy being promoted is to
protect children from being bought and sold as if they were
chattel. While no case was uncovered involving a contract
between a donor and an AID mother, it is doubtful that such
an agreement would be enforced.
One case that deviates from this trend is Reimche v. First
Nat'! Bank of Nevada, 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975). In
Reimche, the court of appeals uphe1d an agreement between
the natural parents of an illegitimate child where the adop-
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Anonymity, however, creates its own set of
problems; for example, lack of access to medical
information that the prospective mother would
want to consider in choosing a donor and which
later could be valuable in assessing the child's
medical needs. Although sometimes it is possible
to have the donor provide a medical profile that
could be referred to if the need arises, it is probably impossible to include every potentially relevant medical fact that may be needed. 36 A complete medical profile by today's standards may not
be adequate in future years.
Anonymity also increases the risk of incest. This
issue has been expressed as a serious concern in the
context of adoption. Although it seems remote,
"the spector of incest is real in traditional (secret)
adoptions . . . . Intermarriage and incest can
only be avoided with certainty when adoptees
have the names of their natural parents." 37 The
potential for incest is likely to be enhanced for the
AID child since AID most often involves a donor
located in the same geographic locale as the
mother. 38

tion by the father was in the best interests of the child and
where pecuniary gain was not the motivating factor on the
mother's part. The mother in that case relinquished the companionship and affection of her child when she agreed to
adoption by the father, promised not to regain legal custody,
and promised to remain silent about parentage until the
father's death. In exchange, the father agreed to care for and
support the child and to leave the mother and child a share
in his will upon his death.
In upholding the agreement, the court distinguished the
case on the grounds that it involved a family agreement.
"The fears that approval of such a policy would lead to the
bartering or sale of children are not borne out where we deal
only with agreements between parents or close family members." Id. at 190. (But see id. at 190, Koelsch, J., dissenting).
See also Couch v. Couch, 35 Tenn. App. 464, 248 S.W.2d
327 (1951); Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 611 (1978).
36. According to Dr. Elizabeth Omand of the Adoption
Forum of Philadelphia, this problem has also been encountered by adoptees, for whom medical information about the
natural parents is similarly unavailable. Letter from Dr.
Elizabeth Omand to Ms. Hilda Silverman of the American
Civil Liberties Union in Philadelphia (Feb. 20, 1981). According to Dr. Omand, serious problems arise when medical
information is obtained in advance of adoption. These problems result from incomplete medical forms and lack of
knowledge of general family medical problems at the time of
adoption. Id.
37. Id. at 2.
38. One lesbian couple living in New York City made
arrangements through friends in California to inseminate
using a donor from the West Coast. This arrangment minimized contact between the donor and the lesbian family.
However, the cost of air fare between the two cities makes

258

WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER

A woman choosing AID by anonymous donor
must also consider the possibility that her child
will later desire to know his or her biological father. This psychological need to know one's biological roots has gained increased recognition in
the context of adoption, and a growing number of
adoptees are urging the courts to relax the closed
record policies of adoption agencies. 39
The single woman who chooses AID as a
method of becoming a parent usually has two
goals: (1) to conceive and bear a child, and (2) to
raise her child without intervention by the semen
donor (i.e., she wishes to raise the child either
alone or in a household in which she and an adult
(or adults) other than the donor serve as her
child's nuclear family). The achievement of these
goals represents the full realization of single parenthood. The remaining sections of this paper will
examine the legal obstacles to their achievement.

this option prohibitively expensive for most people. Interview with lesbian couple, New York, N.Y. (Feb. 1981).
39. Because of the similarities between an AID child and
an adoptee (in both cases a birth parent might be living but
absent), the authors talked to members of the Adoption Forum of Philadelphia about their experiences and about the
importance they place on the child's right to know or have
access to genetic roots. While that group is not a representative cross-section of all adoptees, their views do reflect what
might be expected from at least some of the children born
through AID where the donor is anonymous.
It was the overwhelming consensus of the adoptees interviewed that all people should have the right to know the
identities of their birthparents. Lisa Segal, an adoptee and
member of the Adoption Forum of Philadelphia, describes
the issue as a matter of civil rights. In her view, "no one
should have the power to keep the identity of a birthparent
from you." She emphasized the need for an individual to
know who his or her birthparent is, and said that having an
actual relationship with the birthparent is less important.
"For me, I didn't want or need to develop a relationship
with my birthparent, but I really needed to meet and see
her."
Ms. Segal stated that, of the adopted people she knows,
almost all believe it important to have access to parental
identity. She said that she finds it "hard to understand how
someone would not want to know . . . . I want that right
and I want others to have that right." Furthermore, it
should be noted that Ms. Segal has found and met her
birthparents, and she describes the effect of this meeting as
very positive. "Since then, I've been calmer, more self-assured, more self-confident." Interview with Lisa Segal,
member of the Adoption Forum of Philadelphia, (Nov.
1981). See also Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional
Right to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 120004 (1975); Comment, Adoptees' Equal Protection Rights, 28
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1314 (1981).
40. See supra note 30.

IV.
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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS

The preceding discussion of the concerns of the
prospective single AID mother and the options
available to her highlight two barriers to full realization of the right to be a single parent through
AID. One barrier is the denial of equal access to
AID facilities on the basis of marital status. The
other is the common law precedent that grants
paternity rights to a known semen donor on the
basis of his professed parental expectation when
the donee is single. 40 The first barrier arises from
what appear to be, in many instances, the policies
and actions of private institutions. The second
barrier arises from the actions of the courts as they
interpret and apply state and federal law to family-related issues. The following discussion characterizes each barrier as a form of state action
which violates the Constitutionally guaranteed
rights of individuals.
The fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution is the basis of all federal Constitutional claims challenging unwarranted discrimination and infringement of personal liberty by
state authorities. The guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, which protect citizens from the intrusions
of federal authorities, restrict state action only to
the extent permitted by the application of the
fourteenth amendment. 41 Therefore, in the absence of state constitutional provisions and federal
or state legislation guaranteeing additional rights
to individuals, the fourteenth amendment is the
only legal limitation on state action. 42
The two safeguards of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of personal liberty and freedom
from discrimination are the due process and equal
protection clauses. 43 lri evaluating an equal pro41. The significance of the fourteenth amendment as a
restraint on the states under the due process and equal protection clauses has developed gradually over the years since
its ratification. The Supreme Court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), refused to characterize the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process as an incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights. Subsequently, the Court
selectively acknowledged certain privileges as fundamental
to the concept of due process on the basis of the merits of the
privileges themselves.
42. This assertion is subject to the comments made supra
note 9.
43. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
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tection claim, it is necessary to identify state
action that establishes a classification which acts
to deny certain individuals' rights and benefits
while granting these rights to others. 44 A substantive due process claim focuses on any deprivation
by the state of certain protech~d personal interests
regardless of whether a classification is involved. 45
The due process clause and the equal protection
clause are independent and distinct, but not mutually exclusive guarantees of individual rights. 46
The right to be a single parent through artificial insemination by donor involves both 1) the
substantive due process guarantee of the fundamental right to conceive, bear and raise a child,
and 2) the equal protection guarantee of freedom
from discrimination on the basis of marital status.
The two above-mentioned barriers to the right to
be a single parent through AIU will be examined
separately for specific infringements of the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal protection clauses.

A.
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the context of privately operated AIU facilities,
the relevant inquiry is the degree of interdependence and cooperation between the state and the
AIU facilities that deny equal access to single
women. In answering this inquiry it is important
to investigate the extent of state funding received
by the facility, 49 and the degree of state involvement and participation in the actions of the private entity. 50 An additional factor is whether the
nature of the services provided are "affected with
a public interest." 51 Finally, at least one Supreme
Court decision suggests that the state must have
been involved in making the particular decision
being challenged in order for the state action requirement to be met. 52
The question of state action is thus essentially
one of fact to be resolved on a case by case basis.
State action may exist where the AID facility is
located in a publicly owned building, receives
substantial state funds, is guided in its operations
by state regulations, is affiliated with a public
entity (such as a University teaching hospital) and

Denial of Equal Access to AID Facilities
1)

State Action

The fourteenth amendment protects citizens
from governmental actions, but not from actions
of private individuals or groups. Therefore, the
actions of private entities must be linked to state
action before the fourteenth amendment can be
invoked. 47
The circumstances in which the use of discriminatory and wrongful policies by apparently private groups become state action are determined
by the particular facts of each case. 48 However, in
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law.
44. See Comment, Equal Protection and Due Process:
Contrasting Methods of Review under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C:.L. L. REv. 529, 530
(1979).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 531.
47. Private conduct, "however discriminating and
wrongful," cannot be challenged under the fourteenth
amendment, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment are addressed to
"actions of the political body denominated a State, by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be
taken." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880).
48. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961) ("Only by sifting facts and weighing circum-

stances can the nonobvious involvment of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at 772).
49. See Simkens v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964),
where the court held that a private hospital which received a
Hill-Burton grant was sufficiently involved with governmental action to be subject to the prohibitions under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments against racial discrimination.
50. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961). To find state action, the Court in Burton examined the activities, obligations, responsibilities and interdependence of a state Parking Authority in relation to a private
restaurant engaged in racial discrimination. The Court
placed importance on the fact that the land and building in
which the restaurant was located was publicly owned, the
building was dedicated to public uses, and the upkeep,
maintenance and costs of construction were all payable out
of public funds. But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974) where Justice Rehnquist stated that the
State of Pennsylvania was not sufficiently connected with
the challenged termination of electric service to make the
utility's conduct attributable to the State for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment, where customer showed no more
than that Metropolitan Edison was a heavily regulated private utility with a partial monopoly and that it elected to
terminate service in a manner that the Pennsylvania Utility
Commission found permissible under State law.
51. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (state
action may be present in the exercise by a private entity of
powers traditionally reserved to the state). But see Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 355 (1974), where
the Court writes that this principle cannot be extended to
include actions of regulated businesses, providing arguably
essential goods and services affected with a public interest,
without more.
52. Id.
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provides public services. But how much less than
the aggregate of these factors would be sufficient
for a showing of state action is difficult to determine on the basis of the cases decided thus far.
2)

Denial of a Fundamental Right

Where state action is present in the denial of
access to AID facilities to single women, it can be
argued that the action effectively denies these
women their fundamental right to procreate and
their right to personal privacy. The Supreme
Court expressly recognized a fundamental right to
procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 53 As Justice
Blackmun explained in Roe v. Wade, although
the Constitution does not explicitly mention the
right of privacy, the Supreme Court "has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution." 54 The opinion further states "that only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty' ... are included in this guarantee of personal privacy." 55 Furthermore, the
Court in Roe v. Wade explains that this privacy
right extends to certain activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and childrearing and education. 56
The Court's past and current characterization
of the right of privacy as it relates to reproductive
and childrearing decisions is crucial to an understanding of the protections afforded the single
parent of an AID child. The privacy right was
first endorsed by the majority of the United States
Supreme Court as a constitutionally protected
right in Griswold v. Connecticut. 57 In this case,

53. See 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), where the right to
procreate was first said by the Court to be "fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race." This right was
not then characterized in terms of privacy.
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 152 (1973).
55. Id., quoting from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937).
56. Id. at 152-53. The quotation in full is as follows:
... the right (of personal privacy) has some extension
to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42; id. at 460, 463-65
(White, J., concurring in result); family relationships,
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321U.S.158, 166 (1944); and
child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
supra.
(parallel citations omitted).
57. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the court sought to protect the autonomy of the
traditional family unit and held that the state
could not prohibit the distribution of contraceptives to married couples. 58
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, parental rights to
direct the education of their children were upheld
against state interference. 59 The plaintiffs in this
case, a Catholic society operating parochial
schools and a private military academy, brought
suit to enjoin the enforcement of an Oregon statute requiring parents to send children between
the ages of eight and sixteen to a public school.
The Court found that the statute was unconstitutional because it
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control . . . . The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of
the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations. 60
These early decisions involving the privacy
right firmly establish its protection of the family's
autonomy from the state in matters concerning
the conception and rearing of children. 61 That is,
the privacy right prevents the state from unnecessarily intruding upon the private relationships,
and concerns of the family unit.
58. The Court spoke of a concept of personal "liberty" of
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause and of zones
of privacy created by several constitutional guarantees in the
Bill of Rights. On the basis of either analysis, the Court,
speaking through Justice Douglas, made clear that states
were to respect the privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than
our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. The association promotes a way of life, not causes, a harmony in living,
not political faiths, a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects.
Id. at 486.
59. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
60. Id. at 534-35.
61. See Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 361 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Eichbaum].
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For the purposes of the pres£mt discussion, however, a right of privacy rooted in family-based
values may not be adequate to protect a woman's
decision to achieve single parenthood through
AID. Although her decision to conceive, bear and
raise a child is a private concern involving personal values, it must be recognized that she makes
this decision as an unmarried woman. When a
woman conceives a child without a male partner
and raises this child in a non-traditional family
arrangement, questions arise concerning the extent to which the Constitution protects such an
alternative life style. Federal and state courts
have only inconsistently acknowledged that it is
irrational to make distinctions between legitimate
and illegitimate children, 62 lesbian and heterosexual parents in custody battles, 63 and single and
married people in adoption proceedings. 64
The protection of the reproductive choices of
single women, because it involves considerations
of the moral and social values held by the majority of the public, must rely on broad interpretation of the privacy right. Such an interpretation
upholds a right of privacy based upon principles
of individual equality and autonomy. 65 That is,
the privacy right protects the integrity of personal
decisions concerning individual expression and development. According to this viewpoint, the protection of a woman's decision to achieve single
parenthood through AID is based, at least in part,
on a right to personal autonomy in reproductive
matters even when the manifestations of such autonomy are contrary to social convention.
Support for a broad interpretation of the privacy right can be found in cases relating to the
reproductive decisions of single people. Eisenstadt
62. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972).
63. See LESBIAN MoTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MATERIALS, LESBIAN RIGHTS PROJECT, SAN FRANCISCO (D. Hitchens
& A. Thomas eds. 1980), for a good comparison of diverse
holdings on this issue.
64. See, e.g., In re Joyce's Estate, 158 Me. 304, 183 A.2d
513 (1962), where a single man living alone in his own home
may constitute a family into which an illegitimate child may
be adopted. But see In re Adoption i)f H., 69 Misc.2d 304,
330 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Fam. Ct. 1972), where it was said that
adoption by a single person is generally approved only in
exceptional circumstances and in particular for the hard to
place child for whom no desirable parental couple is available.
65. See Eichbaum, supra note 61.
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v. Baird involved a challenge of state statutes that
prohibited anyone other than a registered pharmacist or physician from dispensing any article
with the intention that it be used to prevent pregnancy. 66 Under this statutory scheme, married
persons could obtain contraceptives to prevent
pregnancy if they were obtained from doctors' or
druggists' prescription. Single persons, however,
could not obtain contraceptives from anyone to
prevent pregnancy. In striking down these statutes the Court observed: "If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." 67
Less than a year later, in Roe v. Wade, the
United States Supreme Court expanded the personal right of privacy to encompass any woman's
decision whether to terminate her pregnancy. 68 At
issue in that case were state statutes which made it
a crime to " 'procure an abortion' ... or to attempt one, except with respect to 'an abortion
procured or attempted by medical advice for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother.' " 69 The
appellant, an unmarried and pregnant single
woman who wished to terminate her pregnancy,
contended that the statutes improperly invaded
the right to choose not to bear a child. In holding
the state statutes to be unconstitutional, the Court
said that the right to terminate a pregnancy belonged to the individual "whether it be founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we
feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to
the people." 70
In Eisenstadt and Roe the Court recognized the
importance of freedom of individual choice where
reproductive decisions are involved. Moreover, in
Roe the personal right of privacy was held to
protect the autonomy of the individual in a situa-

66. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
67. Id. at 453.
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. Id. at 117-118.
70. Id. at 153. The ninth amendment reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
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tion involving social censorship of that individual's choice. 71
In Carey v. Population Services International,
the Court again acknowledged the importance of
personal freedom in reproductive decisions. 72 The
Court affirmed the decision by the district court
which found unconstitutional a statute regulating
the distribution of non-prescription contraceptives to minors: "Read in light of its progeny, the
teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjust intrusion by the state. " 73
Examination of these United States Supreme
Court decisions reveals a somewhat groping historical development of the privacy right. There is
uncertainty surrounding the proper characterization of this right and the extent of the interests it
protects. The Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right of privacy, but it has been
found to exist in the Constitution under various
theories and labels. The Court in Roe v. Wade,
looking back on the cumulative decisions it made
concerning privacy interests in different contexts,
presumably located the privacy right in the Constitution's liberty guarantee. 74
It is not necessary to pinpoint the particular
Constitutional source of privacy interests in order
to identify those interests which are acknowledged as protected under the Constitution. What
is important is that rights relating to procreation,
contraception, family relationships and child
rearing have all been deemed "fundamental." 75
Once deemed fundamental, the fourteenth
amendment protects these rights through the due
process clause. 76
71. The Court in Roe refused to recognize any state
interests that would justify the denial of the right to choose
an abortion altogether. Only the woman, together with her
responsible physician is in a position to consider the relevant
factors of medical, economic and psychological harm of an
unwanted pregnancy. However, important state interests
are permitted to qualify this autonomous decision. These
interests are the protection of the health of the pregnant
woman and the protection of potential human life. Thus, for
"the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its
interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." Id. at 164-65.
72. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
73. Id. at 687.
74. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
75. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
76. See Comment, Equal Protection and Due Process:
Contrasting Methods of Review under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529 (1979).
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Careful identification of the basis of the privacy
right under the Constitution becomes much more
important, however, when predicting the likelihood of the expansion of Constitutional protections to cover new situations. The single woman's
right to be a single parent through AID involves
both the right to bear a child and the right to rear
a child wi~hout a male partner. The fundamental
right to procreate and parent without a man has
not been asserted by the United States Supreme
Court. To expand the interpretation of the privacy right or librety interest to protect such a
decision, the Supreme Court must go further than
it has yet been willing to go to protect alternative
life styles. A protection of alternative life styles
flows more easily from a privacy right based on
personal autonomy (such as that recognized in
Eisenstadt and Roe 77 ) than from a privacy right
rooted in a tradition of the nuclear family. 78
The United States Supreme Court has not demonstrated a willingness to find Constitutional protections of life styles disfavored by majority
norms. There have, in fact, been several conspicuous failures to expand the privacy right to protect
nontraditional families.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited the occupancy of a dwelling by more than
two unrelated persons as a "family" while permitting occupancy by any number of persons related
by blood, adoption, or marriage. 79 The plaintiffs
included three of six unrelated college students
who rented a house in the village. The plaintiffs
contended that the ordinance violated fundamental rights of association, travel and privacy and
was a violation of equal protection. 80 Justice
Douglas asserted that the case involved no such
rights and held that the legislation was rationally
related to the permissible state objective of laying
out "zones where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people." 81
77. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
79. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id. at 9. But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977), where the Court concluded that housing ordinance which limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to
members of a single family deprived appellant of her liberty
in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The ordinance operated in such a manner that
appellant's household, consisting of her son, two grandsons

(1982))
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In Doe v. Commonwealth 82 the Supreme Court
affirmed without comment a judgment made by a
three-judge District Court that a Virginia statute
making sodomy a crime did not deprive adult
males, engaging in regular homosexual relations
consensually and in private, of their constitutional
rights to due process, freedom of expression and
privacy. The Supreme Court's affirmance thus
left unchallenged the District Court's restrictive
interpretation of the privacy right.
In upholding t~e validity of the statute, the
District Court relied upon the precedential value
of Griswold v. Connecticut and several other
cases discussed above. 83 The court noted that these
precedents rest exclusively on the precept that the
Constitution condemns state legislation that trespasses upon the private incidents of marriage,
upon the sanctity of the home, or upon the nurture of family life. According to the District Court
majority, these are the only cCmcerns which have
justified the nullification of shtte intrusion on the
privacy right. 84
The dissenting opinion in Doe found quite a
different message in these precedents:
The Supreme Court has consistently held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of individuals to make personal choices, unfettered by arbitrary and purposeless restrairits,
in the private matters of marriage and procreation. Roe v. Wade; aci::ord Doe v. Bolton. See also Griswold v. Connecticut
(Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
I view those cases as standi11g for the principle that every individual has a right to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's decisions on {>rivate matters of
intimate concern. A mature individual's
choice of an adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his or her own home, would appear

and herself, did not qualify. The Court distinguished this
case from Belle Terre because the Belle Terre ordinance
affected only unrelated individuals whereas the East Cleveland ordinance selected certain cah~gories of relatives who
may live together and declared thilt others may not. The
East Cleveland ordinance thereby impermissibly chose "to
regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply into
the family itself." Id. at 498.
82. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), afj'g 111em. 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975) (Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for
oral argument).
83. See 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
84. Id. at 1200.
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to me to be a decision of the utmost private
and intimate concern. Private consensual sex
acts between adults are matters, absent evidence that they are harmful, in which the
state has no legitimate interest.
To say, as the majority does, that the right
of privacy, which every citizen has, is limited to matters of marital, home or family
life is unwarranted under the law. Such a
contention places a distinction in maritalnonmarital matters which is inconsistent
with current Supreme Court opinions and is
unsupportable. 85
The reasoning in the Doe dissent is very similar
to that expressed by the majority of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey two years later in State v.
Saunders. 86 In Saunders, the court struck down as
violative of the state constitution a statute that
criminalized fornication between consenting
adults. 87 The court found that "as an official sanction of certain conceptions of desirable lifestyles,
social mores or individualized beliefs, [the statute]
is not an appropriate exercise of the police
power." 88 In protecting the privacy right, 89 and
the right to make personal decisions regarding
intimate relationships, the court held that "the
liberty which is the birthright of every individual
suffers dearly when the State can so grossly intrude on personal autonomy." 90
It is significant that the New Jersey Supreme
Court clearly distinguished its refusal to condone
certain kinds of behavior, such as fornication,
from the necessity nevertheless to grant such behavior protection under the New Jersey Constitu-

85. Id. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
86. 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
87. In Saunders the decision was made under the state
Constitution. The court declared that "the lack of constraints imposed by considerations of federalism permits this
Court to demand stronger and more persuasive showings of a
public interest in allowing the State to prohibit sexual practices than would be required by the United States Supreme
Court." Id. at 217, 381 A.2d at 341.
88. Id. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342.
89. Id. at 213-14, 381 A.2d at 339:
We conclude that the conduct statutorily defined as
fornication involves, by its very nature, a fundamental
personal choice. Thus, the statute infringes upon the
right of privacy. Although persons may differ as to the
propriety and morality of such conduct and while we
certainly do not condone its particular manifestations
in this case, such a decision is necessarily encompassed
in the concept of personal autonomy which our Constitution seeks to safeguard.
90. Id. at 220, 381 A.2d at 343.
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tion. 91 The court refused to use the state constitution as a means of imposing majoritarian values
upon the individual in the guise of public interest.
This restraint is also evident in two other recent
New Jersey decisions, concerning euthanasia and
involuntary sterilization, where the court favored
fundamental personal privacy choices after
weighing them in balance with legitimate state
interests. 92
'f.he Saunders court believed that its analysis of
the .privacy right was consistent with United
States Supreme Court decisions on privacy and
procreative decision-making: 93
[T)he Court in Carey and Wade underscored the inherently private nature of a person's decision to bear or beget children. It
would be rather anomalous if such a decision could be constitutionally protected
while the more fundamental decision as to
whether to engage in the conduct which is
necessary prerequisite to child-bearing could
be constitutionally prohibited. 94
The Saunders opinion, by including activities
that lead directly to conception within the protected right of procreative privacy, also appears to
support the single woman's right to choose to conceive through AID. The decision to utilize the
AID method of conception is "at least as intimate
and personal as those [considerations] which are
involved in choosing whether to use contraceptives. "95 Perhaps_ if the United States Supreme

91. Id. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342.
92. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) where it was held that a person
has a constitutional right to discontinue use of artificial lifesustaining apparatus when the prognosis for returning to
cognitive or sapient life is poor. In Quinlan, the patient's
constitutional right of privacy outweighed the public interest
in preserving her life and presented a compelling reason for
judicial intervention. See also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426
A.2d 467 (1981). In that case, judicial intervention was held
to be essential to protect the constitutional rights of a woman
too mentally impaired to make a conscious c_hoice to be
sterilized. "What is at stake is not simply a right to obtain
contraception or to attempt procreation. Implicit in both
these complementary liberties is the right to make a meaningful choice between them." Id. at 250, 426 A.2d at 474.
The court carefully pointed out that although judicial intervention is never authorized to compel sterilization, it may be
permissible in order to protect the best interests of the incompetent where requested by the parents and where certain
procedural safeguards exist.
93. Saunders, 75 N.J. at 214, 381 A.2d at 340.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Court were faced with a case involving prohibitions of heterosexual fornication rather than homosexuality, it too would extend the protections
of the privacy right to such activities. This would
admittedly be small comfort, however, to the prospective lesbian AID mother.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court
has not yet expanded the privacy right as far as
the Supreme Court of New Jersey did in Saunders.
Instead, the one principle that clearly emerges
from Griswold and its progeny is that there is a
right to choose to procreate through traditional
sexual intercourse. To that extent that the single
AID mother is comparable to a single woman
who conceives a child through the sexual act, she
is similarly protected by this case law.
The fact that the AID mother's conception
takes place without any heterosexual relationship,
however, may support restrictions on the procreative right if the following two factors are found
to be significantly harmful to state interests. First,
the unconventional nature of AID conception, as
distinguished from conception by sexual intercourse, may be found to make AID less deserving
of protection than are other forms of "illicit sex."
Second, the single AID mother has deliberately
rather than accidentally chosen the course of parenthood without a male partner. These distinctions between AID and conception by sexual intercourse may be interpreted to justify state
restrictions on the single woman's access to professional AID facilities.
The use of AID as a method of conception does
not involve sexual intercourse, and therefore is not
subject to the legal proscriptions applicable to sexual activity. The courts have refused to equate the
use of AID with immoral sexual conduct, at least
in those cases that sought to find married women
who conceived their children through AID guilty
of adultery. 96 While it is unsettled whether AID
outside the context of marriage is somehow more
"immoral" than AID by married women, there is
no legal basis for asserting that single women who
artificially inseminate are any more guilty of im-

96. See Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331, 334-35 (1979-80). In most jurisdictions AID is not considered adultery unless there has been
actual sexual intercourse. Strong public policy in favor of
legitimacy supports this position. See also In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 74 Misc.2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Surr. Ct.
1973); People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66
Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
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moral conduct than women engaging in extramarital sex.
Single AID mothers have planned their conception as a deliberate, considered event whereas
other single women often become pregnant unintentionally as a result of sernal intercourse. It
follows, then, that the single woman's right to
conceive and bear a child through AID is closely
related to the right to rear a child without a male
partner. To permit AID conception by single
women is to permit planned single parent households.
The planned nature of AID conception renders
it a more preventable occurrence than conceptions resulting from non-marital sex. This is true
at least in the context of restricting access to professional AID facilities. Thus, to the extent that
prevention of AID conception by single women
serves important state interests, 97 denying access
of single women to AID facilities could be justified.
.
In reality, however, barring access to AID facilities is an irrational means of achieving this
state interest, since it would restrict single women's procreative choice while accomplishing no
preventive purpose. Many women would still conceive through AID with a known donor or with
the assistance of a go-between. The simplicity of
the method renders AID conception potentially as
clandestine and unpreventable as premarital sex.
Thus, the prevention of planned single parent
households would not be achieved by restricting
access to professional AID facilities. The use of
other AID methods or sexual intercourse are possible alternatives for single women determined to
have children. Limiting access to AID facilities
only serves to subtract one particular method of
AID conception from the choices available to single women.
The limited effectiveness of restricting access
does not minimize the importance of professional
AID facilities as an option desired by many single
women. A single woman who conceives with the
assistance of professional AID facilities benefits
from a safe source of anonymous donors, and is
most likely thereafter to experience single parenthood free from donor challenges. 98 For some
women this is preferable to the risks and inherent
97. See discussion of state interests, infra Part IV, Section A(4).
98. See supra Part II, Section A.
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difficulties of finding and screening potential
known donors privately. 99 Professionally conducted AID is also preferable for many other single women who believe that sexual intercourse
·with a man outside marriage, or solely for the
purpose of conceiving a child, is not an alternative
consistent with their personal values.
Denying these single women equal access to
AID facilities is a deprivation of their right to
choose an appropriate method of conception. The
question then becomes whether the deprivation of
a choice of method effectively operates as a deprivation of the fundamental right to procreate. If
so, the state must be prepared to justify this deprivation by demonstrating that compelling state interests are thereby served. 100
3)

Denial of Access to AID Facilities on the Basis
of Marital Status

We have just considered arguments that could
support a claim under the due process clause that
the denial of equal access to AID facilities is an
unconstitutional barrier to the exercise of a single
woman's fundamental rights of procreation and
privacy. These arguments also support a claim
rooted in the equal protection clause. 101 As stated
previously, an equal protection claim involves a
classification which acts to deny certain individuals rights and benefits while granting these rights
to others. In the present context, the equal protection claim arises from the fact that some professional facilities and some state statutes discriminate on the basis of marital status. 102 Opening the
doors to married women while closing them to
single women is a scheme of distribution of benefits that raises a claim under the equal protection
clause.
Critics of AID for single women may argue that
the state has no affirmative duty to make avail99. See supra Part II, Section C.
100. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
101. It should be mentioned that there is yet another
means to attack the denial of equal access to AID facilities.
This attack challenges the same conduct, i.e., discrimination
on the basis of marital status, but characterizes it as a violation of due process. This argument is based on allegations
that an institution's policy which denies single women access
to AID is overly broad on its face and thereby creates an
irrebuttable presumption of unfitness. This argument is not
advanced in this paper because it is probably not the strongest means of attacking the policy. See infra text accompanying note 105-06; see also supra note 22.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 8.

266

WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER

able new methods of conception to those who are
otherwise unable to conceive. That is not the issue
before us, however. Here, states have elected to
provide AID, but only as an option available to
married women. Marital status is a classification
used to control access to a particular means of
procreation.
In the preceding section we considered whether
the fundamental right of procreation and privacy
protects an unmarried woman's decision to conceive through AID. When access to facilities is
denied on the basis of marital status, the issue
involved is whether the state may limit a single
woman to conception through the sexual act or
non-professional AID methods even when a professional facility would be a more personally suitable alternative.
4)

State Interests

A court will not necessarily protect a right simply because it has fourteenth amendment dimensions. The determining inquiry is whether the
state can justify the infringement of an individual's right by demonstrating a sufficient state interest.
Under some circumstances, a state can justify
an infringement by demonstrating a rational basis
for its action (rational basis analysis) . 103 When a
fundamental right or suspect class is involved,
however, the state must demonstrate that the
challenged action is necessary to promote a compelling state interest (strict scrutiny analysis). 104
103. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
104. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)
(interstate travel); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621 (1969) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (interstate travel).
The reader may question the need to employ strict scrutiny analysis under the equal protection clause when the
presence of a fundamental right already calls for such analysis under the due process clause. We have argued that the
limitation of any woman's right to artificially inseminate is
an infringement of her fundamental right to privacy under
the due process clause unless such limitation is necessary to
promote a compelling or overriding state interest. A challenge to state regulation under the due process clause is most
appropriate when the law limits the liberty of all persons to
engage in some activity. An absolute denial by law of fundamental rights to everyone who could otherwise exercise these
rights is rare, however. Rights are more often selectively
denied to certain groups of people while other groups freely
exercise these same rights. In the case of artificial insemination, single women are selected out of the general population
of women and are subjected to greater restrictions. It is
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More specifically, the equal protection clause
mandates that a classification be judged by the
"standard of whether it promotes a compelling
state interest" 105 when it either singles out a suspect class for any reason or affects a non-suspect
class' exercise of a fundamental right that is protected by the due process clause. Such a classification "cannot be upheld unless it is supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate those interests." 106
A single woman's right to artificially inseminate, when that right is freely exercised by married women, involves the dual interests of both
equal protection and due process. Although marital status is not a suspect class, artifical insemination, it has been argued above, is a fundamental
right under the due process clause. State restrictions on a single woman's right to artificially inseminate thus affect a non-suspect class' exercise
of a fundamental right and must be strictly scrutinized.
In applying strict scrutiny to analyze state regulations of artificial insemination, it is important to
note that the rights of procreation and privacy are
not absolute, even if fundamental. The Court's
decisions recognizing these rights acknowledge
that some state regulation in areas protected by
that right is appropriate. In Roe v. Wade, for
instance, the Court found that the state interests
in the life and health of the mother and the unborn fetus could justify narrowly drawn state regulation of a mother's right to an abortion during
certain stages of her pregnancy. 107
State policies which prevent a single woman
from conceiving a child through artificial insemitherefore important to find an independent basis for invoking strict scrutiny when challenging these greater restrictions
as a violation of the equal protection clause.
105. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The
Court held that "even under traditional equal protection
tests a classification of welfare applicants according to
whether they have lived in the State for one year would seem
irrational and unconstitutional. But, of course, the traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate
movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the
stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state
interest. Under this standard, the waiting period requirement clearly violates the equal protection clause." Id. at 638.
106. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). See
also discussion of strict scrutiny analysis in Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976);
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254
(1974).
107. 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
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nation will probably focus on the welfare of the
AID child and of society as a whole for their
justification. The state would rely on its recognized interest in protecting the welfare of children
to justify its interference with a single woman's
fundamental right ot procreate. Therefore, the
state is likely to make the following arguments:
a) the child will suffer as a result of his or her
legal or social status as illegitimate, and prospective parents of illegitimate children are therefore
deserving of discriminatory treatment that will
discourage them from procreating; b) the child
will not be provided with suitable care or will be
psychologically harmed by having one parent and
by being denied contact with the biological father
and paternal roots. Each argument will be addressed separately.
a)

Illegitimacy

Historically, illegitimate children experienced
both social and legal consequences as a result of
their disfavored status as the products of illicit sex.
During the last decade, however, the Supreme
Court has found that the equal protection clause
will not permit laws that discriminate against
children on the basis of birth status. The Court's
determination to prevent such discrimination has
been evident in cases involving wrongful death
statutes, child support statutes, workman's compensation laws providing benefits to dependents,
social security benefits, and statutes on intestate
succession. 108
108. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (intestate inheritance cannot depend upon child's illegitimate status); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (illegitimate children entitled to same benefits from their parents'
Social Security disability insurance as legitimate children);
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (illegitimate children
have same right to child support as do legitimate children);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
(illegitimate children may recover in wrongful death action
and workers' compensation claim arising from father's
death); Levy v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate
children have same right to bring wrongful death action as
do legitimate children); Giana v. American Guar. and Liab.
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (mother may recover for wrongful death of illegitimate child). But see Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259 (1978). In Lalli, the Supreme Court found that a
state's compelling interest in the orderly intestate descent of
property justified a state statute that required illegitimate
children to have a court declare paternity during the father's
lifetime and within two years of the child's birth in order to
inherit by intestate succession from their fathers. The court
claimed that this statute, unlike that challenged in Trimble,
was not based on the impermissible state goal of encouraging
legitimate relationships by punishing the child.
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Legal classifications based on illegitimacy have
not been struck down under the strict scrutiny
standard of review. Instead, in these cases a lesser
standard of review has evolved which is more
demanding than the rational basis analysis but
requires only that the statutory classification in
question be substantially related to permissible
state interests. 109 This intermediate standard of
review has apparently been developed in an attempt to protect innocent children from society's
disapproval of the parents' illicit liaisons, while
still deferring to the state's regulatory power in
certain matters. 110
While the Court has usually protected illegitimate children, it has left unchallenged a state's
inclination to discourage illegitimate relationships
through regulation of adult behavior. Parham v.
Hughes 111 is perhaps the best known Supreme
Court decision upholding this type of state regulation. In Parham, the Court affirmed a state's ability to single out illegitimate fathers for discriminatory treatment because of the illegitimacy
relation. In this case, the father of an illegitimate
child was barred from bringing a wrongful death
action after his child and the child's mother were
killed in an auto accident. If the mother had not
been killed she would have been entitled to damages for the wrongful death of her child. The
father was denied this same right because he had
not filed a petition in court to legitimate his son
during the son's lifetime. 11 2
It is important to note that the Parham decision
cannot be explained as an effort by the Court to
punish the father for irresponsible behavior. In
this case, there was evidence that the father, as
well as the mother, was involved in the upbringing of the child. 113 The father had signed the
child's birth certificate, had supported the child
and had visited him regularly. The child had
taken the father's name. What the father had
failed to do was to take the unusually sophisticated step of petitioning the court for legitimation.
It is not certain upon what basis the Court has
distinguished between the need to protect the ille109. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265.
110. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1972).
111. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
112. Id. at 353-57.
113. The father in Parham had unsuccessfully challenged
the statute on the grounds of sex discrimination, id.
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gitimate child and the validity of denying the
parents certain benefits of the parent-child relationship when there is no formal marriage between mother and father. The innocence of the
child and the guilt of the parent is involved, of
course, but it should not be the state's responsibility to punish "sinful" associations unless there is a
constitutionally sound, secular policy for doing so.
One possible policy justification could be the
state's interest in promoting the welfare of children. That is, illegitimate births should be discouraged because of the supposed social stigma
that illegitimate children suffer.
The fact of being differen-t in any way from
their peers often causes children to suffer. There is
therefore some truth to the expectation that children born in this world without legitimate fathers
are likely to feel stigmatized. Whether this is detrimental to the child's well-being, however, is
likely to turn on other factors such as the love and
support of the primary caretakers and the characteristics of the child's peer group.
Regardless of the strength of the social reproach
experienced by the child, the Court has acknowledged that while it can protect the individual
from laws that discriminate, social stigma is an
area beyond its control. 114 Furthermore, a woman
is free "to bring the child into life to suffer the
myriad social, if not economic, disabilities that
the status of illegitimacy brings." 115
Although the Court cannot protect the prospective children of illegitmate liaisons from society's
disapproval, it may attempt to prevent illegitmate
births resulting from AID conception by supporting state restrictions on access to AID facilities.
The Court may presume a state duty to intervene
to prevent the birth of an illegitimate child
through AID which justifies state restrictions on
the right of procreation prior to conception.
At least when racial discrimination is the motive, a state cannot restrict a prospective parent's
constitutional rights in order to avoid supposed
harm to the offspring. In Loving v. Virginia, 116
one of the state purposes advanced to justify a
statute prohibiting a white person from marrying

114. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164, 176 (1972), the Court stated that it is "powerless to
prevent the social opprobrium suffered by illegitimate children."
115. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 377, 386 (1978).
116. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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anyone other than another white person was to
avoid the consequence of a "mongrel breed of
citizens." 117 The Court found this unpersuasive
and ruled that "[u]nder our Constitution, the
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot
be impinged by the State." 118
The Court's particularly strict enforcement of
the fourteenth amendment in cases involving official state sources of invidious discrimination renders the precedential value of Loving in cases involving mothers of AID children doubtful.
Perhaps a better analogy can be made to cases
that deal with a state's power to regulate sterilization, since sterilization also involves intervention
in procreative choice prior to conception. These
cases are discussed in the following section. 119
Another policy justification for state discouragement of the illegitimacy relation is the protection of legitimate status. This policy has been the
guiding light to legal restrictions of illegitimacy in
the past, when the law was applied to assure that
a man's status and wealth would attach to a
woman only when he chose to formalize the union, and would pass only to the children of such a
formal union. 120 One can expect that this policy
will be increasingly subject to challenge in a society that emphasizes achievement and de-emphasizes ascription in awarding status, 121 that becomes more diverse in family organization such
that women-headed households are secondary
norms, 122 and as sex discrimination in statutes becomes more disfavored.
Without substantial state interests to justify a
policy of favoring legitimate associations by disfavoring alternative associations which nevertheless
foster the nurturance and security of children, the
regulations discouraging illegitimacy per se cannot be constitutionally supported. Accordingly,
equal access to AID facilities cannot be denied

117. Id. at 6.
118. Id. at 12.
119. See infra Part IV, Section A(4)(b)(i).
120. Karst, supra note 6, at 678, referring to F. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 376 (S.
Milsom ed., 2d ed. 1968).
121. Karst, supra note 6, at 677, referring to Coser &
Coser, The Principle of Legitimacy and Its Patterned Infringement in Social Revolutions, in CROSS-NATIONAL FAMILY RESEARCH 119 (M. Sussman & B. Cogwell eds. 1972).
122. Karst, supra note 6, at 677, referring to Adams, An
Inquiry into the Nature of the Family, in FAMILY IN TRANSITION 72, 82 (1971).
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single women solely on the basis of their marital
status if the sole state interest is in preventing
illegitimate births~
b)

Harm to the Prospective Child and Burdens
on State Resources

Beyond the question of illegitimacy, the state
may assert an interest in the future well-being of
the prospective child, as well as an interest in
avoiding the burden on society of single parent
families. Two possible ways to analyze these state
interests are by analogy to sterilization cases and
by analogy to those cases where the courts have
intervened to terminate parerl.tal rights.
i)

Sterilization

In 1927, the United States Supreme Court upheld a state statute which permitted the superintendent of a mental institution to order the sterilization of a patient if, in his opinion, it would be
in the best interests of the patient and society to do
so. 123 Since then the practice of sterilizing select
members of society continues, although theories
justifying this procedure are shifting. 124
Sterilization cases provide a useful analogy because, as with legislation forbidding procreation
for single women through use of professional AID
facilities, the state is seeking to prevent conception. The state might argue, however, that less
justification is needed for lt)gislation prohibiting
AID since a fertile single woman has the capacity
to procreate by other means, whereas sterilization
is most often a permanent condition which absolutely bars procreation. 125 Additionally, the burden on the sterili~ed individual is greater since she
must undergo a surgical procedure.
It is conceded that the surgical, frequently permanent nature of sterilization makes this proce123. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
124. Most laws promote the sterilization of mentally ill
people on the basis of eugenics. Recently, the notion that
mental illness is an inheritable trait has come under attack.
Perhaps for this reason, cases on the subject are now developing a theory of substituted consent, which is not based on
the notion of protecting future generations but rather on the
protection of the patient herself. Substituted consent is an
exercise of state parens patriae power where the subject of
the sterilization is not herself capable of consent. See, e.g.,
In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
125. There are some sterilization procedures performed
on women which may be reversed; however, these procedures are still in an experimental stage. E.S.E. HAFER, T.N.
EVANS, HUMAN REPRODUCTION (1973).
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<lure physically more burdensome than is the denial of access to AID facilities. However, a single
woman's supposed capacity to procreate without
AID is often a practical falsehood. The denial of
access to AID for many single women has the
profound effect on constitutiopal rights that
courts have recognized in sterilization cases. This
is because alternative methods of procreation are
not realistic options for the woman who is chilled
from exercising them because of fear of a paternity suit, or for the woman who believes it immoral to have sexual intercourse with a man who
is not her husband, or for a lesbian woman who
does not relate sexually to men. For these women,
denial of AID amounts to a denial of the fundamental right to procreate.
State-ordered sterilization has generally been
supported by three theories: 1) a state's right to
protect itself from future generations of mentally
disabled people; 126 2) a state's interest in protecting the prospective child; 127 and 3) a state's duty
to substitute consent for the woman not capable
of giving her own consent. 128 Only the second of
these is relevant to the analogy between sterilization and denial of access to AID facilities. 129
The state's interest in the well-being of the prospective child might be asserted in terms of the
state's right to protect itself from the consequences
of single women conceiving through AID and
burdening state resources. The state might allege
that denying single women access to AID would
serve a legitimate state interest since unmarried
mothers are likely to go on welfare and become an
economic burden on the state. 13° Further, the
state may argue that a child raised without a
father will have emotional problems and will put
a strain on already limited social services. The

126. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
127. In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d
307 (1976).
128. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
129. The state's right to protect itself from future generations of mentally disabled people is not implicated in the
access of single women to AID facilities. The theory of substituted consent will not be analyzed here since it does not
apply to the prospective AID mother, who is capable of
making her own decisions.
130. While it is true that the majority of welfare recipients are comprised of one parent families, this is due, at least
in part, to welfare regulations. Of the 3,842,534 families on
welfare, only 5 perce'nt of 192,603 are two parent households. However, in 24 of the 50 states, two parent families
do not qualify for welfare no matter what their income.
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PLANS FOR Am TO FAMILIES WITH
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state may even go so far as to say that these children will necessarily be malajusted and will not
contribute to society either because they will become criminals or will be deviant in some other~
way.
Even if it w~re true that single mothers are
likely candidates for welfare rolls, the state would
not thereby be justified in limiting access to AID.
Since women are frequently poor as a result of
discrimination, the state should not be permitted
to compound these inequities by further discriminating against single women in the protection of
their constitutional rights. Also, it should not be
assumed that because a woman is not married she
will be the sole economic support for her child.
Many women seeking AID are part of lesbian
couples or extended family arrangements and
plan to raise the child in a family environment
with other adults sharing parenting responsibilities.131 Further, there is a compelling argument
that a woman who goes through the trouble of
artificially insemination wants very much to be a
mother and has economically prepared for the
expense of child-rearing. These are significant factors in the development of a well-adjusted child
who will not grow up to be a burden on society. 132
DEPENDENT CHILDREN UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, TITLE IV A, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (E.
Chief ed. 1981).
131. Sutton, The Lesbian Family: Rights in Conflict Under the California Uniform Parentage Act, 10 GoLDEN GATE
L. REV. 1007 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sutton, Lesbian
Family].
132. See generally Comment, Adoptees' Equal Protection
Rights, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1314 (1981) and cases discussed
therein.
In addition to the asserted economic burdens on the state,
an interest in the prospective child's well-being may be advanced in order to justify denying single women access to
AID facilities. This argument is based on the assumption
that life without a father is inherently disadvantageous to a
child. See discussion of C.M. v. C.C., infra notes 219-21 and
accompanying text. In that case, the court stressed the importance of father-child relationships as its basis for granting
donor paternity rights.
However, in the face of growing numbers of single-parent
families, experts no longer uniformly accept the assumption
that single-parenthood is injurious to children. For instance,
one article on the subject emphasizes that "single-parent
families can have various strengths, including: provision for
greater adult self-expression ... ; greater family nurturance
than the previously unstable family experience of its members; and greater exposure of the children to a wide variety
of potential socializing agents and models." Verzaro & Hennon, Single-Parent Families: Myth and Reality, 72 J. HOME
EcoN. 31, 32 (Fall 1980). See also Barry, A Research Project
on Successful Single-Parent Families, 7 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 65 (Fall 1979).

ii)
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Intervention in Existing Parent-Child Relationships

A second way to analyze the state interest in
denying access to AID facilities is by analogy to
cases where the state has intervened and terminated a parent-child relationship. Termin'ation
cases require a finding that the parent is unfit or
that state intervention is in the best interest of the
child. 133
It should be noted that there are major distinctions between state denial of access to AID facilities and state intervention into existing family relationships. First, state intrusion into an existing
family is generally based upon some belief that
parent-child relationships in that family are inadequate or unhealthy. This determination is
based on the particular and unique circumstances
of each family. Denial of access to AID facilities,
on the other hand, constitutes a determination
that single AID parenthood is per se harmful to
the prospective child, without consideration of
individual facts and circumstances. Furthermore,
in the case of the prospective AID mother and
child, the state is seeking to prevent the occurrence of that relationship rather than to terminate
an existing relationship. In spite of these distinctions, however, arguments used in termination
cases may be raised by the state. For that reason,
we will consider current legislative and judicial
standards for termination as they might apply in
the AID context.
UNFITNESS ST AND ARD
The traditional view holds that natural parents
have a right to the custody of their children until
and unless they are shown to be unfit. Applying
this standard to the denial of equal access to AID
facilities, the state would have the burden of
proving the prospective AID mother is unfit because she is unmarried. 134

133. "Termination involves the elimination of any legal
recognition of a continuing parent-child relationship and,
usually, the end of any social recognition of the relationship.
This remedy may be contrasted with a custody order which
vests a non-parent with temporary authority over a child,
but does not eliminate the parent's residual right to reclaim
the child at some later date.·· Boskey & McCue, Alternative
Standards for the Termination of Parental Rights, 9 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1, 4 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
134. A similar argument was used by the state in Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), but the Supreme Court
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The "unfitness" standard focuses on the behavior of the parent. Most legislation adhering to this
view lists specific behavior deemed to constitute
unfitness. 135 Often, this list includes a category
labelled "neglect" which may be given a broad
interpretation. For example, "neglect" may include: physical abuse, inadequate supervision or
housekeeping, emotional neglect, inadequate parenting, sexual abuse, failure to provide medical
care, parental conduct that constitutes contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and immoral or
unconventional parental behavior. 136
This standard focuses on the parent's qualifications for parenting. Intervention may therefore
occur even when there is no clear evidence that
the parent's behavior or lifestyle adversely affects
the child. 137 Thus there have been cases, seemingly aberrational, where the state has removed
children from parents because the parents were
unmarried or because the parent was the mother
of an illegitimate child. 138 These cases reflect a
rejected the state's presumption that unwed fathers are unfit
per se.
135. See, e.g., abandonment (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
435 (1974)); mental disability (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §
1510 (Smith-Hurd 1980)); habitual drunkenness (lowA CoDE
ANN. § 232.4l(d) (West 1969)); child neglect (Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 453.040(4) (Vernon 1977)); alcoholism, substance
abuse, moral depravity (CAL. C1v. CoDE § 232(a)(2) (West
1982)); desertion for 90 days (HAw. REv. STAT. § 5782(c)(l)(A) (1976)).
136. See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27
STANFORD L. REV. 985 (1975).
137. See infra note 138. See also Sheppard, Lesbian Custody and A Quest for Normative Standards, WoMEN's RTs.
L. REP (1983) (forthcoming).
138. In re C., 468 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). In
this case the Springfield, Missouri Court of Appeals wrote:
The appellant has been promiscuous in the sense that
that word means improperly indiscriminate in sexual
relations, and her promiscuity has amounted to a continued course of conduct over a period of several years.
The record permits the inference, as the trial court
indicated in its findings, that the appellant may not be
sure which of the men with whom she has lived is
actually the father of her children. It has repeatedly
been held in this state and elsewhere that proof of
adultery amounting to promiscuity established parental unfitness in actions for the custody of children, and
in our view it may also establish unfitness in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, at least where, as
here, there appears to be little likelihood of self-rehabilitation by the parent, and it appears probable that
the child will be subjected to substantial immoral and
debasing influences if left with the offending parent . . . . The trial court found that the parents of
these children were unfit bv reason of their debauchery and repeated lewd and iascivious behavior. In our
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judicial presumption that the children of such
parents are morally depraved.
It is conceivable that a presumption of immoral
or unconventional parental behavior would also
influence state policy concerning single women's
access to AID facilities. Yet morality and convention are not static concepts under the law, or in
society. Judicial and legislative definitions of
moral neglect traditionally are formulated on the
basis of societal norms. As changes take place in
the American family and accommodations to
these changes evolve, it becomes increasingly difficult for a court to label a person presumptively
unfit solely because she is not married. 139 The
court cannot be blind to the fact that nearly one
in five families with children is maintained by
only one parent and more than 17 .1 % of all births
are to unmarried women. 140
BEST INTEREST ST AND ARD
A best interest test focuses on the particular
circumstances of the child rather than on the behavior or lifestyle of the parent. It is commonly

opm10n, the judgment could be justified on that
ground alone.
Id. at 692 (footnote and citations omitted). The court also
cited the following cases in support of its conclusion: Yount
v. Yount, 366 S.W.2d 744, 748-49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); I. v.
B., 305 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Craves v.
Wooden, 291 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Mo. App. 1956); In re
Morrison, 259 Iowa 301, 305, 144 N.W.2d 97, 102-03
(1966); In re Welfare of Three Minors, 50 Wash.2d 653, 656,
314 P.2d 423, 427 (1957); In re Johnson, 9 Wisc.2d 65, 72,
100 N.W.2d 383, 390 (1960). See generally Note, The Custody Question and Child Neglect Rehearings, 35 U. CHI. L.
REV. 478. 485 11968\.
But see In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 260, 63 Cal. Rptr.
252 (1967) (fact that the mother was living with a man to
whom she was not married was not sufficient to justify adjudication of public wardship of her children); Ill re Cager,
251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968) (illegitimate child cannot
properly be judicially found to be neglected because of sole
fact that he lives with a mother who has another illegitimate
child living with her); Craig v. McBride, 8 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2229 (Alaska Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1982) ('"To avoid even
the suggestion that a custody award stems from a life style
conflict between a trial judge and a parent, we reiterate that
trial courts must scrupulously avoid reference to such factors ... ."id.).
139. But see supra note 138.
140. Today, more than 17 .1 % of all births are to unmarried women and nearly one in five families with children is
maintained by only one parent. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES
(102d ed. 1981); Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1159 (1980).
See also supra note 138, for discussion of cases dealing with
this issue.
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employed to settle custody disputes rather than
termination petitions. Nevertheless, parental
rights have been cut off without proof of unfitness
in cases where the court determined that termination was in the child's best interest. 141
A relaxation of the unfitness prerequisite for the
termination of parental rights does not bode well
for a liberalization of the parental rights of single
women. Access to AID facilities can be no more
protected than the right upon which it is basedthe right to establish a home and bring up a child.
Looking at the circumstances surrounding the
child rather than the parent, the state could allege
as a basis for restricting access to AID facilities
that an AID child who is born to a single woman
(and who is without access to a father) would be
in danger of suffering psychological harm. Such
psychological harm is not in the best interest of a
child, and on this basis a state employing the best
interests standard could conceivably block prospective single mothers from access to AID facilities.
However, there is serious debate over the constitutional validity of applying this standard in
termination proceedings. Critics allege that it is
unconstitutionally vague, gives impermissibly
broad discretion to judges, and fails to give the
proper protection to the rights of parents to raise
their children. 142 The best interest test fails to spell
out the possible grounds for termination and rests
on subjective judicial evaluation of all "relevant"
criteria.
In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supre.me Court recently cast serious doubt on the state's power to
terminate parental rights absent proof of unfitness.143 In that case, the Court was not faced with
deciding the constitutionality of the best interests

141. See analysis of the changing standard for termination of parental rights in New Jersey in Boskey & McCue,
Alternative Standards for the Termination of Parental
Rights, 9 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (1978). See also Sorentino v.
Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 367
A.2d 1168 (1976) (Sorentino I) and 74 N.J. 313, 378 A.2d 18
(1977) (Sore11tino II); In re Guardianship of D., C., E., and
A., 169 N.J. Super. 230, 404 A.2d 663 (Juv. & Dom. Rel.
l979) for examples of cases which seem to lean toward application of the best interests standard in termination proceedings.
142. See Chemeninsky, Defining the "Best Interests":
Constitutional Protections in Involuntary Adoptions, 18 J.
FAM. L. 79 (1979).
143. Santosky v. Kramer, 50 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. Mar.
~4, 1982).
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test. There is dicta in the opinion, however,
which strongly suggest that any test which does
not require proof of unfitness is unconstitutional. 144
In essence, then, while the state may presently
succeed in denying procreative rights under a
mere best interests test, this standard may not
withstand constitutional attack.
B.

Common Law Recognition of Donor Paternity Claims

The preceding section of this paper characterized the denial of equal access to AID facilities as
a barrier to the exercise of a single woman's right
to privacy in making decisions concerning procreation and childrearing. The present section characterizes the common law recognition of donor
paternity claims as a second barrier to a single
woman's exercise of privacy rights and also as a
barrier to the exercise of the right to sole custody
of the AID child.
1.

State Action

When challenging a donor paternity claim under the fourteenth amendment, the first inquiry is
whether a state court's recognition of the paternity claims of a known donor can be deemed state
action. If so, the likelihood that such state action
could be held to violate the rights of single mothers of AID children must be assessed.
The actions of a member of a state judiciary in
his or her official capacity may constitute state
action within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. 145 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the court characterized judicial action as

144. "The Family Court judge in the present case expressly refused to terminate petitioners' parental rights on a
'non-statutory, no-fault basis.' Nor is it clear that the State
constitutionally could terminate a parent's rights without
showing parental unfitness." Id. at 4337 n.10. See also, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977).
145. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880).
"Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without
due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition, and as
he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the
State's power, his action is that of the State." See also Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hughes v. Superior Court,
339 U.S. 460 (1950); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, (1964).
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state action, stating that "[t]he test is not the form
in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact
been exercised." 146
Donor paternity claims emerged as a second
barrier to the single woman's right to single parenthood through AID in the New Jersey Superior
Court decision in C.M. v. C. C. 147 In 'this case, the
court found that the best interests of the child
mandated the grant of paternity rights to a known
donor who professed expectations of parenthood,
even though the child's mother opposed the granting of such rights. 148 The decision involved judicial consideration of the respective rights of the
particular donor and donee. 149
The decision in C. M. v. C. C. signals potentially adverse consequences for single women who
choose AID arrangements with known donors. It
is a common law precedent that may well deter
the practice of extra-professional methods of AID
by persons similarly situated to the parties in that
case. The court's refusal to recognize the mother's
desire to be free from a donor's intervention in
childrearing could in some cases curtail the single
woman's right to conceive through AID altogether.
2)

Denial of a Fundamental Right

The presence of state action in the form of a
judicial decision regarding paternal rights to a
single mother's AID child, in conjunction with a
denial of access to AID facilities, obstructs the
single woman's right to procreate at two levels.
While the denial of access to AID facilities limits
the use of anonymous donors, the common law
recognition of paternity claims discourages the use
of known donors. A woman who is denied access
to professional AID facilities, or who otherwise

146. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
147. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 820 (Cumberland
County Ct. 1977).
148. Id.
149. C.M. v. C.C. was never appealed. However, a challenge to state common law as Constitutionally invalid could
possibly be brought before either the state or federal courts.
See Nolen v. Wilson, 372 F.2d 15, 17 (1967): "The states
themselves have a large capacity for self-correction of their
institutions and officers. But when violations of fundamental
rights or interests of the individual are both alleged and
proved, which controlling law ha.s determined to be protected under the Constitution and laws of the United States,
intervention by the federal district court to grant appropriate relief is justified."
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chooses to conceive by known donor, risks the
deprivation of her asserted right to single parenthood after her child is born.
In asserting a right to single parenthood a single
AID mother appears to be claiming for herself
greater rights than are possessed by any other
mother. In fact, however, the rights and responsibilities of mothers of AID children are similar to
the rights and responsibilities of mothers of other
illegitimate children. The assertion of a right to be
free from paternity claims in the case of AID
mothers arises from the distinctions between donors and fathers of other illegitimate children.
These distinctions will be discussed in more detail
below. 150 At this point, it should be noted that a
donor, unlike other fathers, is probably not obligated to assume any responsibility for his offspring unless he subsequently elects to do so. A
donor is thus free from legal responsibilities until
he claims legal rights. 15 1
Those engaging in sexual relations assume responsibility for potential parental consequences.
150. See infra Part IV, Section B(4).
151. Research has revealed no paternity suits initiated by
a donee against a donor. Nevertheless, at least in the case of
an anonymous donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use by a married woman, a donor's freedom from
responsibility is a likely outgrowth of the People v. Sorensen
rationale, see infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
This approach has been legislated in at least six states that
have essentially adopted the following provision of the Uniform Parentage Act § 5(b): "The donor of semen provided to
a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a
married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law
as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived," see CAL. C1v. CooE § 7005 (West Supp. 1980);
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. §
61-306 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT: § 126.061 (1979);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1982); WYO.
STAT. § 14-2-103 (1980).
The question then becomes whether the donee's marital
status will affect the donor's legal responsibilities. A recent
article in the Harvard Women's Law Journal can be read to
stand for the proposition that, at least where a professional
AID facility is used, a donor would not be obligated to the
AID child of an unmarried woman:
. .. the mother who wishes to separate herself totally
from the child's father is well advised to be inseminated only with the sperm of an anonymous donor.
The solution must lie in allowing unmarried women to
conceive by A.I. with anonymous donors, such as is
now done by married women.
Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial
Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family,
4 HARV. WoMEN°S L.J. 1, 16 (1981).
The remaining issue, then, is whether an unmarried woman's use of a known donor would (or should) make a difference with regard to the donor's rights and responsibilities,
see discussion of C.M. v. C.C. infra note 168-71 and accompanying text.
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The selection of an AID method of conception
and the absence of sexual relations between a donor and a donee implies a concerted effort to
avoid these same consequences and to develop a
wholly new understanding between biological
parents. 152 A donor's ability to subsequently
breach this understanding without the donee's
consent is the basis of donor paternity claims.
Equal access to AID facilities would permit single women to conceive through the use of anonymous donors with professional assistance. In their
attempt to protect donors from potential paternity suits that might be instituted by donees, AID
facilities are strict in their preservation of donor
anonymity. 153 The incidental reciprocal advantage of these policies for donees is the security of
knowing that anonymous donors are unlikely to
discover the identity of their children. 154 The protection afforded by this anonymity is particularly
important if courts continue to recognize the paternal interests of known donors. 155
It seems, then, that opening doors of AID facilities to single women, without a corresponding
recognition of the right to single parenthood
through private and non-clinical AID methods,
creates an inherently coercive situation. Women
who want to be single parents will be forced to
use professional AID facilities in order to preserve

152. The authors can think of only one situation where
this may not be the case. This is when the donee and donor
are an .unmarried couple who have turned to AID after
having unsuccessfully attempted to conceive through sexual
intercourse. This situation is similar to that of a married
couple's use of AIH (Artificial Insemination by Husband). In
these unusual cases, however, it should be a fairly simple
matter for the donor to present evidence of parental expectations, and thus gain the rights of other unwed fathers. See
infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text for discussion of
the comparisons and distinctions between donors and unwed
natural fathers.
153. See Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best
Interests of the Sperm Donor 14 FAM. L. Q. 1 (1980). The
thesis of this article is that most of the informal policies
concerning AID as it is presently practiced in the United
States are based on exaggerated fear of potential suits for
parental obligations against donors. Recordkeeping on donors is minimal or non-existent as a result of this fear, even
though there are no such suits reported. See also text accompanying notes 11-14 (the Curie-Cohen survey revealed that
92. 2 % of the doctors surveyed kept permanent records of
recipients, 36. 9 % kept permanent records on children born
after artificial insemination, and only 30.4 % did so on donors. Curie-Cohen survey, supra note 11, at 588).
154. Id.
155. See discussion of C.M. v. C.C. infra text accompanying notes 168-71.
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their parental rights. The possibility that known
donors may be granted paternity rights by the
courts is clearly an inducement to use anonymous
donors.
As women turn to the use of professional AID
facilities to the exclusion of other options, AID
conception will be under increasing state control.
In the interests of public health and safety, the
state can claim the power to regulate the process
by choosing which genetic material is stored, selected, and distributed. 156 The intensely private
act of conception may be taken into the social
sphere of reproductive engineering when AID is
involved.
Unlike women who conceive in traditional
ways, the AID mother may well feel compelled to
acquiesce in such state eugenic policies. Her desire
to maintain autonomous control over conception,
the dangers of clinical donor screening, and the
political implications of eugenic decisions made
without her input may pale in comparison to her
desire to conceive free from the risks associated
with known donors. 157
A limited necessity for state control of AID facilities arises ftom the difficulties associated with
an anonymous donor pool. For example, the failure to keep permanent records of donors and their
issue in order to conceal their identity results in a
potential for consanguinity, inbreeding, and the
repeated transfer of inheritable disease. 158 These
problems indicate a need to regulate the anonymous donor pool. However, there is no corresponding rationale to limit or regulate the use of
known donors. One can expect no greater genetic
problems in children that result from the private
156. Although there may be general agreement with the
practice of negative eugenics (prevention of eugenic diseases), the practice of positive eugenics (genetic improvement) is controversial. Donor selection is often done by physicians not trained for the task and clearly reflects their bias.
See Kindregan, State Power Over Human Fertility and Individual Liberty, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1401 (1972).
157. See supra Section II, Parts A-C.
158. Id. Using a single donor for many recipients may
result in inadvertent consanguinity or inbreeding. AID practitioners inadequately protect against this result. Few have
policies limiting the number of times a single donor will be
used within one community. Since permanent records of
donors are seldom kept and the identity of donors is almost
always concealed, a recipient may be inseminated with the
semen of a relative and two AID children sharing the same
genetic father could conceivably mate.
Donors are usually selected by the physician who performs
the insemination. They may find the donors themselves, or
use sperm banks or donors selected by associates.
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selection of a donor by a donee or go-between
than result from the random selection of mates
throughout the population.
Single women who resist this coercion and privately arrange artificial insemination with known
donors may do so based on concern for the child's
future health. The increasing importance of preventive health measures that utilize family health
records, and the possible psychological importance to the children of being able to identify their
roots, makes knowledge about donors crucial. If
this is the woman's judgment, then she presently
assumes the risks associated with the court's
power to transform a donor into a father with
equal rights in the AID child. 159
3)

Discrimination on the Basis of Marital Status

Discrimination by the state in the enjoyment of
privacy rights is apparent in granting paternity
rights to known donors to single women when
anonymous donors to married women have no
such rights. The decision in C.M. v. C. C. 160 constitutes a special exception to the established policy that the status of a donor cannot be equated
with that of a legal father. 161 Arguably, this exception was made "because of" rather than "in
spite of' the marital status of the donee, and constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 162
159. See, e.g., discussion of C.M. v. CC., infra text
accompanying notes 168-71.
160. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland
County Ct. 1977).
161. This "special exception" is most clearly understood
upon examination of the facts of C.M. v. C.C. In that case,
the AID mother was single, and she and the known donor
were friends who had been dating and had discussed marriage. According to the opinion by the Cumberland County
Court in New Jersey, C.C. wanted a child "and wanted
(C.M.) to be the father, but did not want to have intercourse
with him before their marriage." Id. at 161, 377 A.2d at
821-22. It was not until after conception of the AID child
that their relationship changed, leading to C.C.'s wish to
raise the child on her own. Id. See infra notes 168-171 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the court's rationale in
granting visitation rights to the donor.
The situation in C.M. v. C.C. is readily distinguishable
from cases involving anonymous donors, who have absolutely no parental expectations and thus have not been
viewed as either the legal or natural father, see People v.
Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7
(1968); UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT §§ 5(a)-(b), 9A U.L.A. 592-93
(1979).
162. Accord Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1978), where the Court discussed the need to
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Court decisions concerning custody, support
and visitation of AID children have declined to
view the donor as the legal father when the donee
is married. 163 Furthermore, although the donor is
not legally considered the father, courts have been
reluctant to announce the AID mother's husband
as the legal father even when he had consented to
the conception; instead courts have deemed AID
children illegitimate. 164 It was not until recently,
in People v. Sorenson, 165 that the court imposed
the status of legal father on the husband of a
married donee where he had given his consent to
the procedure. In that case the court wrote:
A child conceived through heterologous
(AID) artificial insemination does not have a
"natural father" as that term is commonly
used. The anonymous donor of the sperm
cannot be considered the "natural father,"
as he is no more responsible for the use made
of his sperm than is the donor of blood or a
kidney . . . . Since there is no "natural father," we can only look for a lawful father .... [A] reasonable man who, because
of his inability to procreate, actively participates and consents to his wife's artificial insemination in the hope that a child will be
produced whom they will treat as their own,
knows that such behavior carried with it the

demonstrate that discriminatory impact on a group can be
traced to a discriminatory purpose when making an equal
protection claim. The Court wrote that " 'discriminatory
purpose,' ... implies more than intent as violation or intent
as awareness of consequences .... (citation omitted). It
implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,· and
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 279.
163. See People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495,
66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968); Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W.
2308 (1955) (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954);
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406
(1963); Strnad v. Strnad 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390
(1948).
164. See Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308
(1955) (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954);
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406
(1963); cf. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc.2d 886, 246
N.Y.S.2d 835 (1964) (where the court relied on Gursky, but
held the husband liable for support without actually ruling
on the legitimacy of the children). But see In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 74 Misc.2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973) (holding that "a child born of consensual AID during a valid
marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage."
Id. at 105, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435-36).
165. 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
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legal responsibilities of fatherhood and criminal responsibility for non-support.166
Past decisions indicate that the best interest of
the AID child was not always the determinative
factor in the proceedings. For, instance, the court
has proclaimed a child illegitimate or as being
without either a legal or natural father rather
than imposing responsibility for a child upon an
unwilling husband. 167
In the decisions concerning husbands of AID
mothers, the granting of legal father status occurs
when the husband indicates voluntary assumption
of the responsibilities of fatherhood by giving his
consent to the procedure. By focusing on the husband's consent, the courts reveal a concern for
protecting the husband from parental responsibil'ities not of his choosing. Though none of these
decisions involve known donors, the courts are
likely to similarly protect a known donor if he
resists the responsibilities of fatherhood and lacks
paternal expectations at the time of the insemination.
In C.M. v. C.C. the court professed to grant
the legal status of father to a known donor because "there was no one else who was in a position
to take upon himself the responsibilities of fatherhood when the child was conceived." 168 The court
went on to say that "C.M.'s consent and active
participation in the procedure leading to conception should place upon him the responsibilities of
fatherhood. The court will not deny him the privilege of fatherhood."169
In ruling for the donor, the court did not limit
itself to addressing the best interests of the child.
Rather, the court emphasized the donor's expectations as a determining factor in conferring the
status of legal father.
The decision in C.M. v. C.C. considers the
parental expectations of the father and then seems
to assume that the existence of a man willing to be
a father is bound to be in the best interests of the
child. No corresponding consideration is given to
the mother's expectations, or the possibility that
single parenthood would be in the best interests of

166. Id. at 284-85, 437 P.2d at 498-99, 66 Cal. Rptr. at
10-11.
167. See supra note 164.
168. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 167, 377 A.2d
821, 824 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
169. Id. at 168, 377 A.2d at 825.
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the child. Instead of carefully considering the two
possible arrangements, the court makes a presumption in favor of the father. The presumption
that a father per se is good for the child can be
seen as purposeful discrimination against single
women, and lacks consideration of the child's interests.
If the presumption that a legal father is always
good for a child were truly based on the child's
best interests, then it would be applied in all cases
whether the woman was married or not. Yet in
some cases, such a presumption in favor of legal
fatherhood was not applied even when there was
a husband available to assume the role. 11 0
The presumption is more likely based upon a
1
bias in favor of the traditional family structure
and opposed to a family that is the result of only a
mother's efforts. However, denial of single motherhood is not a rational or effective means of promoting this traditional family unit since fatherless children are far more .often 'the result of
illegitimacy and divorce than of AID. 171 An attempt to stifle the single woman's use of AID will
not significantly diminish the number of womenheaded households.
A presumption in favor of paternal rights can
be expected to restrict the definition of parenthood to the more traditional mother/father household. However preferable this may seem, in it
remains to be answered whether it is appropriate
to discourage single women, who are capable and
desirous of loving and providing for children,
from doing so. In light of the many single parent
households that presently exist, it is possible that
the "ideal" family is so far from common reality
that the professed state interest in paternal rights
serves primarily as an excuse to prohibit the legal
recognition of new family relationships.
/
In dealing with these questions, the presumption that any father who expressed parental interest is 1 always better than no father at all needs
closer examination. The more appropriate standard would be for courts to determine what is truly
in the child's best interests on a case-by-case basis.

170. See Doornbos v. Doornbos; 23 U.S.L.W. 2308
(1955) (Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954);
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406
(1963); see generally supra text accompanying note 164.
171.. See Curie-Cohen Survey, supra note 11, at 588 (survey estimates 5,400 AID births per year).
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4)

State Interests

The preceding section characterized the common law recognition of donor paternity claims as
a barrier to the single woman's achievement of
single parenthood through AID. This barrier represents potential violations of due process and
equal protection. The due process violation arises
from the court's use of marital status as a classification that serves to deny single women the freedom from donor paternity claims that is granted
to married women.
As discussed earlier in this paper, the denial of a
fundamental right invokes strict scrutiny of the
state interests that are offered in justification of
this denial. Therefore, it is necessary to identify
the state interests and to determine whether they
are sufficiently compelling b> justify abridgment
of the asserted constitutional rights. The common
law recognition of donor paternity claims is
rooted in state policies that a) protect the constitutional rights of unwed fathers and b) promote
the best interests of children in custody decisions.

a.

Rights of the Donor

The state's interest in protecting the rights of
the donor can be traced to cases recognizing the'
equal protection and due process rights of illegitimate fathers. 172 The landmark case in this area is
Stanley v. Illinois. 173
In Stanley v. Illinois, petitioner contested an
Illinois law which provided that parents were entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their
children could be removed from their custody,
but denied such a hearing to unmarried fathers.
Denial of a hearing, the petitioner argued, was a
violation of his right to procedural due process.
Further, since the statute did not apply to unwed
mothers, the petitioner argued that he had been
denied equal protection of the law. The Court
analyzed each claim separately and ultimately
found for petitioner on each point.
The Court held the statute unconstitutional because it presumed all unmarried fathers were un-·
fit per se. In evaluating the privacy interest at
stake in Stanley, the Court wrote that "the rights

172. For cases discussing the equal protection and due
process rights of illegitimate fatheI·s, see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quillo.in v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
173. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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to conceive and to raise one's children have been
deemed 'essential,' ... '[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights'. . . ." 174 Custody
and control of one's children could not be denied
any parent without a hearing on the question of
parental fitness. Presuming rather than proving
parental unfitness, even if more convenient and
efficient for the State, is repugnant to the Constitution and impermissible.
In Caban v. Mohammed an unwed natural father of two children challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute that granted an unwed
mother the authority to block the adoption of her
child by withholding her consent, but did not give
an unwed father a similar right. 175 The statute
was held to violate the equal protection and due
process clauses because it withheld from the father substantive rights granted to all other classes
of parents. 176
In these cases the Court has recognized the protectible due process interests of parents in the
"companionship, care, custody, and management
of his or her children." 177 The privacy interest
involved here, "that of a man and the children he
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection." 178 The unwed father is entitled to
notice and the opportunity for a hearing that is
granted to all other classes of parents under the
equal protection clause. 179
One can applaud this line of cases upholding
the rights of illegitimate fathers as an encouragement of male involvement in the responsibilities
and benefits of child rearing. If men are to be
more involved with the nurturing of the children
that they bring into the world as a result of their
relationships with women, they must benefit
equally from the legal protections available to
mothers.
Nevertheless, while the strengthening of the legal parental rights of illegitimate fathers may be
laudable, those same parental rights should not
automatically be applicable to a donor . 180 Rights
174. Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
175. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
176. Id. at 391, 394.
177. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 658.
180. Judge Testa in C.M. v. C.C. had a different opinion,
and wrote that "if an unmarried woman conceives a child
through artificial insemination from semen from a known
man, that man cannot be considered to be less a father
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and responsibilities should be commensurate with
the actions that invoke them.
The Court has shown itself to be fully capable
of recognizing such distinctions. In Quilloin v.
Willcott, the Court found that the principles of
the equal protection clause did not give an unmarried father the same authority as a divorced
father to veto the adoption of his child. The state
was not foreclosed from recognizing the "difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare
of the child" 181 between that of an unwed father
who had never shouldered any significant responsibility for the child's rearing and that of a divorced father who at least will have borne some
responsibility for the child's rearing. 182
The Quilloin court examined the unwed father's due process claim separately, and determined that his substantive parental rights were
not overridden by the state's finding that adoption
was in the best interests of the child. 183 The Court
wrote that:
the Due Process Clause would be offended
"[i]f a State were to attempt to force the
breakup of a natural family over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the
sole reason that to do so was thought to be in
the children's best interest." 184
In Quilloin, however, the adoption gave "full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a
result desired by all concerned, except appellant." 185 The unwed father never had or sought

because he is not married to the woman." 152 N.J. Super.
160, 167, 377 A.2d 821, 824 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
181. 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
182. Id. See also Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979),
for an example of a factual context in which the state can
limit the paternal rights of illegitimate fathers. In Parham a
statute that denied the father of an illegitimate child the
right to sue for the child's wrongful death was upheld. The
Court held that the statutory bar against illegitimate fathers
was not discriminatory and was rationally related to the
legitimate state interest of maintaining an accurate and efficient system for disposition of property at death. Although
mothers of illegitimate children were permitted to sue, the
Court found no basis for a sex discrimination claim since the
varying treatment was based on actual differences in their
situation rather than on overbroad generalizations regarding
sex. Only a father could make an illegitimate child legitimate by voluntary, unilateral action under the state's law.
183. 434 U.S. 246, 254 (1978).
184. Id. at 255 (quoting from Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
185. Id.
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actual legal custody, so no finding of unfitness
was necessary . 186 A finding in favor of the adoption according to "the best interests of the child"
standard did not offend the unwed father's due
process rights. 187
Stanley and Caban can be reconciled with
Quilloin by examining the different standards
used by the Court to protect the paternal interests
in each situation. In Stanley and Caban the court
required proof of the fathers' unfitness before
their due process interests in the child Could be
terminated. 188 In Quilloin, the father's interests
were held to be adequately protected by the "best
interests of the child" standard under both the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 189
Thus, courts apply different standards depending upon whether a relationship with the children
as de facto fathers has been established by the
biological fathers before the court. 190 In Quilloin,
the biological father had never lived with the
child nor shared childrearing responsibilities. In
Stanley and Caban, on the other hand, the fathers
had maintained a relationship with their children
as psychological parents. They resided with the
mothers and children as part of a family unit at
some point in time and contributed to their support.
The status of the biological fathers as de facto
parents presented the Court with the question of
whether an existing family could be justifiably
altered. The Stanley Court decided that when the
issue is the dismemberment of a family, the state
must prove rather than presume unfitness of the
parent. 191 This was the only sound means of promoting the Court's stated interest in preserving
"the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only
when his welfare or safety or the protection of the
public cannot be adequately safeguarded without
removal." 192
In Quilloin, the father's involvement in the
lives of his biological children as a de facto father

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
Illinois

Id.
Id.
405 U.S. 645 (1972); 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
434 U.S. 246 (1978).
Sutton, Lesbian Family, supra note 131.
405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972).
Id. at 652 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., c.37, § 701-2, the
child neglect statute).
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was minimal. 193 Absent this de facto parental relationship, the state was required to demonstrate
only that the adoption and denial of legitimation
was in the "best interests of the child." 194 This
standard served the substantial state interest in
maintaining continuity for the children of an existing family unit. 195
This analysis of the rights of unwed fathers is by
no means intended to convey the idea that an
anonymous donor has the same paternal interests
in the AID child as belong to the natural father of
an illegitimate child. The anonymous donor is not
the natural father as that term is normally used. 196
In donating his sperm for professional services
with the clear expectation of preserving anonymity, the donor has no expectation of enjoying the
paternal rights ordinarily- due biological fathers
under the due process clause. 197 It has been succinctly stated that "the donor's biological tie triggers Stanley rights, but his lack of familial expectations regarding any assertion of those rights
under the circumstances of the donation operate
both as his consent to their relinquishment and as
his elimination as the child's natural father at
law." 19s
When a known donor is involved in the conception of an AID child, the situation is more complex. If the donor wishes to claim paternity rights
in the AID child, he shares the same burdens as
those imposed on illegitimate fathers. First, the
donor must prove his biological paternity. 199 Even
if the donor is able to prove biological fatherhood,
it is doubtful that the court would then equate the
legal status of a known donor with that of an
illegitimate father, without more. For example,
in a paternity proceeding against a natural father,
proof of biological fatherhood would result in
support obligations regardless of the father's expectations. 200 However, there has not yet been a
193. 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
194. Id. at 255.
195. Id.
196. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66
Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
197. Sutton, Lesbian Family, supra note 131, at 1029.
198. Id. (emphasis in original).
199. Id. at 1022-24.
200. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. ~535 (1973).
In one paternity suit brought before Family Court in
Manhattan, the alleged father of an illegitimate child sought
to make parental expectations a relevant element of his defense. Frank Serpico, the defendant, claimed that he was
fraudulently assured by the child's 1nother that she was practicing birth control when she wa~; actually trying to con-

279

case imposing obligations of fatherhood on a
proven known donor when these obligations are
not consistent with his expectations. One may assume that if a donee instituted suit against a
known donor for support, the court will find it
necessary in the interests of fairness to receive
evidence regarding the donor's familial expectations at the time of the donation before imposing
such obligations.
Accordingly, in the interests of fairness to the
single mother of an AID child, the court should
find it relevant to consider the familial expectations of a known donor before recognizing the
donor's paternal rights in a suit brought by the
donor against the donee. The donor should be
required to come forth with evidence that it was
his intention at the time of insemination that he
would be a father to the child. The donee should
be given the opportunity to rebut this evidence
and to come forth with her own contrary information.
ceive. Serpico was represented by Karen DeCrow, a prominent feminist and former president of the National
Organization for Women. The supposed objective of the
defense was equality between the sexes in matters of procreative choice. Defense counsel argued that a support order
would deny Serpico his constitutional right to choose
whether or not to become a parent. This right, based on
Supreme Court decisions authorizing the availability of contraceptives and abortion, applied to men as well as to
women. Trial Judge Dembity held for Serpico in that the
"[p]etitioner's wrong precludes her transfer to him of her
financial burden for the child she alone chose to bear." It is
not clear whether the judge based this decision on the mother's fraud, the father's claimed right to choose, or both.
Margolick, Paternity Suit Focuses 011 Feminism and Freedom, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1981, at Bl, col. 1.
In evaluating the validity of parental expectations in the
context of children conceived through intercourse, it is important to distinguish three distinct aspects of procreative
choice: 1) the right to conceive, 2) the right to bear and
3) the right to rear a child. Only a woman is entitled to the
protection of her right to choose whether to bear a child.
Thus, a father's rights of choice in the decisions to conceive
or rear a child are distinguishable from the "right to choose"
to abort accorded women in Roe. It is fair to say, however,
that men and women should have equal rights in the conception and rearing of children. This would place the burden of
contraception as well as child support on both sexes. A man
who chooses not to have a child should be held responsible
for child support even if he personally took the necessary
contraceptive precautions. To find otherwise would allocate
the risks associated with birth control and the burden of
unintentional births exclusively on women. It is prohibitively difficult to prove whether a conception resulted from
defective birth control or intentional planning.
We suggest that no such difficulty exists in the situation of
an AID donor. The act of abstaining from sexual intercourse
indicates a decision to forgo the associated risks and to reject
parental rights and responsibilities.
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If the donor makes a sufficient showing of familial expectations a court could be justified in
recognizing the paternal interests of a donor as
being similar to those of an unwed father. That is,
proof of the donor's parental expectations is the
~hreshold requirement for standing to assert even
those limited paternal rights automatically vested
in unwed natural fathers.
The known donor who meets this threshold requirement, like the recognized natural father, is
entitled to certain due process procedural protections which are accorded all unwed fathers. These
include the right to notice and the opportunity for
a hearing before changes in custody arrangements
are made. 201 It is uncertain, however, whether
such a donor is entitled to have his substantive
rights protected by the application of the standard
used in Quilloin or that used in Stanley. 202 Quilloin holds that, in the absence of a de facto parental relationship, an unwed father's substantive
rights are adequately protected by application of
the "best interests of the child" standard. 203 In
Stanley, the unwed father had maintained a relationship with his two children for years, and was
entitled to recognition and preservation of his parental rights absent a showing of his "unfitness."204
Donor paternity claims are distinguishable
from the unwed father's claims that have been
recognized in cases employing the strict unfitness
standard. These distinctions allow a court to find
against a donor without an actual showing of the
donor's unfitness. First, both Stanley and Caban
involved the protection of an existing paternal
relationship against competing custodial claims of
the state. In comparison, the known donor does
not compete with the custodial claims of others
who are seeking to supplant his existing paternal
role, but with the single mother seeking sole custody. Second, Stanley and Caban sought to protect an existing family unit in which the unwed
father exercised the role of a de facto parent. In
the case of a known donor's paternal claims, however, the state would not be breaking up a natural
family unit by denying paternal custody or visitation to the known donor. In fact, the recognition

201. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 173-95 for full
discussion of these standards.
203. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
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of the paternal rights of a donor may result in the
disruption of the family unit to which the single
woman already belongs.
It should be mentioned that the known donor
who petitions for paternal rights immediately after the AID child's birth has not had the opportunity to serve as a de facto parent. The application
of the Quilloin "best interests" standard rather
than the Stanley "unfitness" standard is not a punitive measure, however. Rather, it is a recognition that the best interests of the child should be
the court's foremost concern whenever the unwed
father's commitment to the child is minimal. A
known donor, even one with parental expectations, exhibits a commitment to the child which is
as minimal as that of any unwed father who contributes nothing more than genetic material.2° 5
The courts may therefore refuse to acknowledge
the paternal interests of the known donor if it can
be shown that it would be in the best interest of
the child to do so. This standard offers adequate
protection of the donor's interests under the due
process and equal protection clauses. 206
b.

Best Interest of the Child

In any custody dispute between a donor and
the mother of an AID child, the courts will weigh
three competing interests: the asserted rights of
the AID mother, the asserted paternity claim of
the donor, and the best interest of the AID child.
Before an analysis based upon the intersection of
these interests can be considered, it is necessary to
set out the manner in which courts have treated
each of these issues as they have arisen within
more traditional frameworks. This section will
present, briefly, the historical treatment of child
custody actions.
Judicial treatment of custody actions has, for
the most part, paralleled society's treatment of
women and roles within the family. 207 Historically, English common law gave custody of children to fathers at the termination of a marriage.

204. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972).
205. For discussion of the exception to this statement, see
supra note 152.
206. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
207. For a socioeconomic analysis of family law as it developed in the United States, See WoMEN AND REVOLUTION
(L. Sargent ed. 1981). See also J. MITCHELL, WOMEN'S EsTATE (1971), F. ENGELS, The Origins of the Family, Private
Property and the State, in SELECTED WoRKS II (1962).
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These decisions were consistent with the then
prominent idea that a man, as head of his family,
had a paramount right to the custody, care and
services of his children. This was a valuable property right at that time, since children were a financial asset to the family unit.
This presumption favoring paternal rights had
been written into Roman Law and was carried
over to the English and American legal systems. 208
One American decision reflec~ting this view is an
1857 case decided in New York. In People v.
Humphries, the court, while acknowledging that
the husband was a wife beater, found that fact no
bar to his right to the custody of his children. 209
The only perplexing question seen by that court
was how to separate a brea~tfeeding child from
the bosom of her mother. Thus, the court stated,
The only difficulty, if any, in the present
case in regard to the right of the father to
retain the child, arises from the child being
of tender age, and deriving its sustenance, in
part, from the breast of the mother. But
upon the evidence, I think these circumstances form no obstacle to the father's
right. 210
After considering the question, the court still
found the father's right to override the interests of
the mother and the child.
The judicial policy favoring a father's right to
custody was replaced over time by a policy which
granted a nearly prima facie right to the mother.
This trend occurred simultaneously with changes
in the socio-economic role of women. As industrialization moved "breadwinners" away from the
home, the woman's role as the sole caretaker of
the family became more pronounced. Woman's
work became more clearly defined as distinct
from the role of the husband and the father. The
fact that the man had a job outside of the home
forced the woman to accept full responsibility for
maintaining the home and the children in it. This
division of labor was justified by the view that,
because the woman is the one who conceives and
bears the children, her role as mother must be
accepted as her biological destiny. Since the
woman was believed to be the prime nurturer and

208. King, Child Custody-A Legal Problem?, 54 CAL.
ST. B.J. 156 (1979).
209. 24 Barb. 521, 523 (1857).
210. Id.
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caretaker of children, it was also assumed that it
was in the best interest of the children to be in the
custody of their mother. As one court put it, there
is no substitute for "motherly love." 211
This "tender years" doctrine holds that, absent
a compelling reason for placing custody elsewhere, a mother is entitled to the custody of her
children. When both parents are deemed fit, the
doctrine swings the scale in favor of the mother if
the child is of "tender years." 212
Gradually, this presumption came to be looked
at with skepticism. Some jurisdictions that continued to apply it no longer relied on the romantic
idea that a mother is somehow more fit for custody than a father. Instead, these courts utilized
the doctrine as a procedural tool for deciding custody where the facts did not dictate a contrary
result. 213
In recent years, an increasing number of jurisdictions have abandoned gender-based doctrines
altogether and have embraced a sex-neutral
standard intended to consider only the "best interest of the child." Under the best interest rule,
courts consider the physical, intellectual, moral
and spiritual well being of the child. Any factor
bearing on the child's well-being is relevant. 214
Since the courts have wide discretion in this area,
and because matters such as these are subjective,
parents in custody actions in which the best interest standard is applied are subject to the personal
opinions and beliefs of the judge hearing the
case. 215
211. Meinhart v. Meinhart, 261 Minn. 272, 111 N.W.2d
782 (1961).
212. A child is considered to be of tender years until the
beginning of his or her teenage years. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY
LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1977).
213. The "tender years" presumption does not reflect or
derive from the mother's "right," whether that right be characterized as "prima facie" or otherwise. It is procedural
only. One party or the other must have the burden of proof.
Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. 229,
312 A.2d 58 (1973).
214. Factors which courts might consider in deciding a
child custody case include issues of a parent's morality, character, past misconduct, past mental or emotional illness,
current marital status, neglect and cruelty, interracial marriage, full-time employment, characteristics of the proposed
home, preference of the child, religion, homosexuality and
financial ability. PENN. BAR INSTITUTE, FACTORS DETERMINING THE AWARD OF CUSTODY BETWEEN PARENTS (1979).
215. For instance, in Krabel v. Krabel, the court ruled
that the mother could only retain custody if she "has either
married or broken off the relationship, and her present conduct establishes the improbability of future 'lapses.' "8 FAM.
L. REP. {BNA) 2249 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Dec. 18, 1981,
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In many cases, competing parties in custody
actions stand in relatively equal positions before
the deciding judge. Custody disputes often follow
the break-up of a marriage between two people of
similar backgrounds and social position. Both parties are fit to be parents, and it remains for the
judge to determine what is best for the child.
The "best interest" standard presumes that neither parent is necessarily more fit because of his or
her gender. Custody must be determined according to the character of the individual parents and
their specific family situations. Persons involved
in less conventional custody disputes, however,
are more likely to suffer from this broad judicial
discretion than are their counterparts in more traditional family settings. This is because of the
judicial preference for two-parent heterosexual
families. This bias is boldly stated in C.M. v.
C.C: "It is in a child's best interest to have two
parents whenever possible." 216
Such an attitude clouds the specific circumstances of each custody case, as the judge may be
unable to prevent his belief that the traditional
nuclear family is best from influencing his view of
the needs of single parent children. The judicial
discretion permitted to make each custody decision unique cannot be free from social bias, thus
obscuring the individual circumstances of each
case.
Although the best interest standard was designed to correct the bias inherent in gender-based
doctrines, 217 the application of this standard raises
serious constitutional questions in some cases. The

dominant social influence of majoritarian values
precludes the judicial consideration of the rights
of non-traditional parents under the best interest
standard. However, this majoritarian preference
is vulnerable to challenge on fourteenth amendment equal protection and due process grounds,
as well as on grounds that such bias violates the
parent's rights under the first amendment to freedom of expression and association. 218
The case of C.M. v. C.C. 219 is a good example
of the problems that arise in an unconventional
custody dispute. A careful analysis of that case
reveals: (1) the failure of the best interest standard to accomplish its presumed goal of focusing on
the individuality of each case rather than applying a blanket stereotype; (2) the inconsistency
with which courts deal with donors; and (3) the
absence of concern for the individual rights of the
single AID mother.
In C.M. v. C.C., 220 the court does not even
entertain the possibility of leaving the child in the
sole custody of the mother, without interference
by the donor. The court did not attempt to weigh
the competing arrangements to determine which
would be in the child's best interests. Instead it
adopted the judicial "policy favoring the requirement that a child be provided with a father as
well as a mother." 221 The case can be interpreted
in a number of ways. On the one hand; the court
claimed to be protecting the parental expectation
of the donor. 222 On the other hand, the case may
be expanded to stand for the rigid enforcement of
traditional values upholding the nuclear family.
A recent article on the subject of AID stated
that C.M. v. C.C.

released Jan. 25, 1982). See also Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill.2d
377, 400 N .E.2d 421 (1979) (open and continuing cohabitation of mother with her boyfriend was sufficient reason to
remove children from mother's custody and grant custody to
father).
On the other hand, a recent Alaska Supreme Court decision held that "[t]o avoid even the suggestion that a custody
award stems from a life style conflict between a trial judge
and a parent, we reiterate that trial courts must scrupulously
avoid reference to such factors .... " Craig v. McBride, 8
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2229 (Alaska Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1982). A
court's failure to explicitly refer to lifestyle factors in custody
cases does not mean that these factors are not considered,
however. For a discussion of how judicial biases regarding
life styles affects the outcome of termination of parental
rights cases, see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
216. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 167, 377 A.2d 821, 825 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
217. It has been argued that the tender years doctrine is a
violation of equal protection and due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as
well as a violation of the Equal Rights Amendments of the

could also be extended to hold that a known
sperm donor must be recognized as the father of an unmarried woman's child in a
case where neither party intended the man
to act as the father or to play any greater

various state Constitutions. The United States Supreme
Court has not reached the question. But see Springs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 274, 368 A.2d 635 (1977); McGowen v. McGowen, 248 Pa. Super. 41, 374 A.2d 1306 (1977).
218. For a thorough analysis of First Amendment rights
within the context of lesbian custody cases, see, Sheppard,
Lesbian Custody and a Quest for Normative StandardsWomen 's Rts L. Rep. (
).
219. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland
County Ct. 1977).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 166, 377 A.2d at 824.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 168-171.
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role in the child's development than providing the sperm for its conception. 223
Furthermore, although the court in C.M. v. C.C.
mentions that "[i]t is in the child's best interests to
have two parents whenever possible," 224 the opinion fails to examine the possibility that the home
created by C.C. may have been better for her
child than one in which C.M. may intervene. The
court ignores the problems and antagonism that
may arise as a result of the donor's intervention
into an established family unit, and the effect that
such antagonism could have on the AID child. 225
In the process, the court also effectively denies
single mothers the right to the full realization of
single parenthood through AID.

v.

CONCLUSION

Recognition of a single wc>man's desire to conceive a child through AID conception as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States requires a broader interpretation of the fundamental rights of procreative privacy, than has yet been explicitly endorsed by the
United States Supreme Court. Case law dealing
with contraception and abortion clearly protects a
single woman's decision to prevent an unwanted
pregnancy, and the right to choose which is the
heart of this case law demands protection of a
single woman's decision to conceive. The decision
of a single woman to conceive necessarily involves
a non-traditional family arrangement, however,
so protection of this decision additionally requires
at least passive acceptance of alternative lifestyles.
The single parent family that results when a single
woman gives birth as a consequence of sexual
intercourse is in fact a passively accepted arrangement in American society. However, given the
unique circumstances of AID conception, the
question becomes one of whether the state may
constitutionally prevent this particular type of single parenthood.
The state interests that can be asserted to support restrictions on a single woman's right to conceive, bear and raise a child through AID concep223. Kritchevskv, The Unmarried Woman '.s Right to Arti,ficial lnseminatior;: A Call for an Expanded Definition of
Family, 4 HARV. WoMEN°S L.J. 1, 15 (1981).
224. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 166-7, 377 A.2d
821, 824-25 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
225. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CmLD 53, 116-18 (rev. ed. 1979).
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tion (e.g. the prevention of illegitimacy,
avoidance of potential harm to the child and protection of the child's best interests) are not any
more compelling in the AID context than they are
in the context of other single mothers. Therefore,
the single AID mother should not be subject to
any greater suppression of her procreative rights
than is directed towards other single mothers.
Limiting access to AID conception on the basis of
marital status is no more acceptable than attempts
to prohibit conception through sexual intercourse
on the basis of marital status. The fact that AID
conception may be more susceptible to successful
prohibition does not render the prohibition more
justified.
· In determining how much suppression of conception is permissible, it is important to distinguish the state's ability to encourage certain desired forms of behavior through legitimate state
regulation from the state's deprivation of fundamental rights. The state may choose to make contraception freely available or to subsidize sterilization procedures, but it cannot force or prohibit an
individual's use of contraceptives or submission to
sterilization without such action being subject to
strict scrutiny. Similarly, the state may treat parents of legitimate children and parents of illegitimate children differently if such treatment is rationally related to some legitimate state interests,
but such treatment cannot result in the deprivation of a fundamental right unless it is the least
restrictive means of serving compelling state interests.
Furthermore, due to the availability of alternative methods of conception, blocking access to
AID facilities on the basis of marital status does
not effectively serve any state interest in the prevention of conception of illegitimate children or
the avoidance of potential harm to such children.
This lack of access does, however, infringe on the
single woman's rights of privacy and procreation
as they relate to her choice of the means of conception most consistent with her personal values.
Restrictive access thus functions as a deprivation
of at least some single women's fundamental
rights while being an impermissibly broad means
of advancing the compelling state interest in the
welfare of children.
The state interests asserted to justify the common law recognition of a donor's paternity
rights-Le., the rights of unwed fathers and the
determination of the best interests of children-
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should not be protected by an automatic finding
that two parents are always better than one. The
protection of a single woman's right to be a single
parent through AID can be consistent with the
promotion of these asserted state interests because
1) a donor does not have the same constitutional
rights as other unwed fathers unless he had parental expectations at the time of donation; and 2) a
woman can responsibly and conscientiously
choose the option of single parenthood without
necessary detriment to the child.
A court that is sensitive to a single woman's
right to be a single parent through AID, to the
protection of the rights of unwed fathers, and to
the best interests of the AID child may often decide in favor of single parenthood through AID.
Such a court would require that a donor who
wishes to assert a claim of paternal rights in the
AID child must prove his biological paternity and
the existence of parental expectations at the time
of the insemination before his constitutional rights
as a father would be recognized. The recognized
constitutional rights of unwed fathers are minimal
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in the absence of a de facto parental relationship
and are adequately protected when the court's
decision is made in the best interests of the child.
In making a determination of the child's best
interests, the court must weigh in each case the
potential benefits that would result from the denial of a donor's paternity rights with the benefits
that would result from the granting of such rights.
This balancing must include an honest, unbiased
appraisal of the woman's ability to care for the
child without the assistance of the donor, and of
the potentially disruptive impact of the donor's
intervention into the mother's existing family
group. This balance essentially weighs the benefits of the home in which the single mother intended to raise her AID child without the donor's
interference against the benefits of the known donor's subsequent involvement in that home. At the
very least, the court must be able to appreciate
the mother's preference as a valid alternative in
order to adequately protect the mother's individual constitutional rights as well as the best interests of her child.
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